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ARTICLES
DOES UNITED STATES V WINDSOR (THE

DOMA

CASE) OPEN THE DOOR TO CONGRESSIONAL
STANDING RIGHTS?
Bradford C. Mank*

ABSTRACT

In rare cases, a President refuses to defend a statute based upon a belief that
the statute is unconstitutional. The law is unclear whether either House of Congress

* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O. Box 210040,
University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Telephone 513-556-0094, Fax 513-556-1236,
e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine for his comments. All errors or omissions are my
responsibility. This article is one of a series of explorations of modem standing doctrines. The other
pieces are: (1) Should States Have GreaterStanding Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v.
EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1701 (2008); (2) Standing and Future
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standingfor the Unborn?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVL. L. 1
(2009); (3) Standing and StatisticalPersons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q.
665 (2009); (4) Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects ProbabilisticStanding, but a "Realistic
Threat" of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89 (2010); (5) Revisiting the Lyons Den:
Summers v. Earth Island Institute's Misuse of Lyons's "Realistic Threat" of Harm Standing Test, 42
ARiz. ST. L.J. 837 (2010); (6) Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implicationsfor Future Standing
Decisions, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10958 (2010); (7) Standing in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing Whdn Environmental Harm Is
Difficult to Prove, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 307 (2010); (8) Informational Standing After Summers, 39
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (2012); (9) Reading the Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power
Co. v. Connecticut, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 543(2012); (10) Judge Posner's "Practical" Theory of
Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer's Approach to Standing Than Justice Scalia 's, 50 Hous. L. REv. 71
(2012); (11) Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable Standing Causation
Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 869 (2012); (12) Is Prudential
StandingJurisdictional?,64 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 413 (2013); (13) Clapper v. Amnesty International:
Two or Three CompetingPhilosophiesof Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REv. 211 (2014).
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has Article III standing to defend a statute that the President refuses to defend. In
United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court in 2013 addressed the
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). The Obama
Administration took the middle position of declining to defend DOMA, but still
enforcing it, despite its view that the statute was unconstitutional to assist federal
courts in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute. It was unclear whether an
appeal was proper in the case once a district court held the statute was
unconstitutional, and the Executive Branch essentially agreed with that decision.
Applying both prudential standing principles and mandatory Article III standing
rules, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, recognized that the Executive
Branch was an appropriate party on appeal because it continued to enforce the
statute. Additionally, the majority acknowledged that briefs filed by House of
Representatives leadership supporting the constitutionality of DOMA supplied the
necessary adverseness in the case given the Executive's view that DOMA was
unconstitutional. The majority did not fully resolve the thorny issue of
congressional standing in cases where a President refuses to enforce a federal
statute. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, emphasized the almost exclusive role of the
Executive Branch in defending federal laws under Article II, squarely rejected
congressional standing, and argued that no party had standing to appeal in Windsor
because the Executive agreed with the district court's judgment holding Section 3
unconstitutional. By contrast, Justice Alito, in his dissent, would have expressly
recognized the authority and standing of the leaders of either House to defend any
federal statute that the President does not defend. Yet by acknowledging that
congressional participation could supply the necessary adverseness to litigate a case
when the Executive Branch agrees with the challenger that a statute is
unconstitutional, the Court's opinion in Windsor likely will pave the way for
increased congressional participation in unusual cases where the Executive Branch
believes a statute is unconstitutional, but at least one House of Congress wishes to
defend the statute's constitutionality.
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INTRODUCTION

Article II of the Constitution requires that the President "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."' In accordance with this provision, the Executive
Branch, through the Department of Justice (the "DOJ"), routinely defends federal
laws whose constitutionality is challenged, 2 but occasionally refuses to do so.'
During various presidential administrations, the DOJ has taken different positions
on its duty to defend federal laws. In 1981, the DOJ took the position that "[t]he
Department appropriately refuses to defend an act of Congress only in the rare case
when the statute either infringes on the constitutional power of the Executive or
when prior precedent overwhelmingly indicates that the statute is invalid."4 The
DOJ subsequently took a broader view of presidential discretion to decline to
defend a federal statute in 1994, especially in cases where a statute arguably
"encroach[es] upon the constitutional powers of the Presidency."5 Because the DOJ
acknowledged the ultimate role of the United States Supreme Court in deciding
constitutional issues, even if the President disagrees with its decision, the 1994
DOJ opinion suggested that the Executive Branch might, in some circumstances,
enforce a law whose constitutionality it doubted to create a justiciable controversy
so that the Court could make the final decision on its constitutionality.6

1U.S. CONST.

art. II, § 3.

2 Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 938-39 (2012) ("The approximately 10,000

lawyers at the DOJ take the lead role in defending lawsuits against the federal government and suing to
enforce the law at the trial level."); Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the
Principle-Agent Problem, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1201, 1210-12 (2012) (explaining central role of DOJ in
defending federal laws); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J.
1183, 1196-98 (2012) (explaining that Executive Branch lawyers routinely defend the constitutionality
of federal laws). Sometimes Congress places responsibility for government litigation outside the DOJ,
especially in the case of independent agencies; a full discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of this
article. See Gorod, supra, at 1223-24.
' Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1198 ("Thus, one can say in general that refusals by the [E]xecutive [Biranch
to defend or enforce acts of Congress are extraordinarily rare. But they do occur ... ").
' Att'y General's Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25, 25 (1981); 43 Op.
Att'y Gen. 325, 325 (1981).
' Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Hon. Abner J. Mikva,
Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 199, 199-203 (1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/nonexcut.htm (considering seven different factors regarding whether the President may decline to
enforce a statute); see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 518-19 (2012) (discussing the Dellinger Memorandum).
6 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 5, at 200-01; Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 518-19.
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There has been a continuing debate about whether a President has a duty to
enforce or, to the contrary, a duty to decline from defending or enforcing a statute
the President believes is unconstitutional. 7 There is a middle position that a
President should enforce a statute whose constitutionality the President doubts if
there is a possibility that the federal courts will decide that the statute is
constitutional, because a justiciable controversy may exist only if the DOJ at least
nominally enforces the statute while openly expressing any doubts about its
constitutionality.8 As will be discussed, one reason for arguing that a President
should enforce a potentially unconstitutional statute is because the law is unclear
whether Congress has the authority to intervene and Article III standing to defend a
statute that a President refuses to defend.9

7 Compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 72 (5th rev. ed.
1984) (arguing that the President has a duty to enforce a statute he or she believes is unconstitutional),
and Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REv. 381, 382-84 (1986) (arguing the
same, but acknowledging that "the Executive can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute when
judicial review has been properly instituted"), with Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 509-10, 512-13
(arguing that the President should not defend or enforce a statute he or she believes is unconstitutional).
See Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated, 161 U. PA.
L. REv. 291, 306-07 (2012) ("Nondefense decisions better respect separation-of-powers principles than
do nonenforcement decisions.... Nondefense thus splits the difference: the President defers to
Congress by giving the statute effect through enforcement and by giving Congress an opportunity to
defend the law, but he also gives voice, particularly in court, to his own concerns about the act's
constitutionality."); Walter Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 2011, http://
the
Obama
(defending
www.tnr.com/article/politics/84353/gay-man'iage-obama-gingrich-doma
Administration's decision to enforce but not to defend DOMA because "[h]ere, the [P]resident has
decided to comply with the law and leave the final decision of its constitutionality to the courts, a course
of action that respects the institutional roles of both Congress, which passed the law, and the judicial
branch"); Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How CongressionalStanding Can Solve the
Enforce-But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 577, 581 (2012) ("My arguments against
interpretive obligation are not arguments against judicial review, and inter-branch interpretive dialogue
is enhanced when the President gives the courts an opportunity to weigh in on his (non)enforcement
decisions based on his reading of the Constitution."); Peter M. Shane, Not Defending DOMA: A
Conscientious and Responsible Decision, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://
("[T]he
www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-m-shane/not-defending-defense-of-marriage-b_828348.html
[E]xecutive stance [of enforcing but not defending a law] does not deprive the law of defenders. In the
case of DOMA, for example, courts are likely to allow Congress to intervene and offer a defense.").
9 Compare Greene, supra note 8, at 582-98 (arguing that Congress or either House has standing to
defend a statute that the President refuses to defend, but acknowledging counterarguments), with Tara
Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress's (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 571, 572-73, 625-32 (2014) (arguing that the Take Care Clause gives the Executive exclusive
authority to defend federal laws, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the
President refuses to enforce a law and also contending that bicameral principles in the Constitution bar
one House of Congress from defending a challenged federal statute), and Tars Leigh Grove, Standing
Outside of Article 111, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2014) (manuscript at 3-4, 39-48) (arguing Congress
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In United States v. Windsor,'° the United States Supreme Court in 2013
addressed the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).ll The Obama Administration took the middle position of not defending
DOMA yet still enforcing it, despite its view that the statute was unconstitutional,
to assist federal courts in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute. 12 It was
unclear whether an appeal was proper in the case once a district court held the
statute was unconstitutional, and the Executive Branch essentially agreed with that
decision.13 The Obama Administration recognized that the leadership of the House
of Representatives could file briefs in support of DOMA, but argued that the
Executive Branch alone had exclusive authority to defend federal statutes even if
Congress or either House in some circumstances could file amicus briefs on a
particular issue.14
Applying both prudential standing principles and mandatory Article III
standing rules, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion recognized that the Executive
was an appropriate party on appeal because it continued to enforce the statute by

lacks authority under Article I to defend or enforce a statute and therefore lacks Article II standing),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfln?abstract-id=2362961. See also Meltzer, supra note
2, at 1211 ("[lit is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may intervene as a party or simply
file a brief as an amicus and whether, if it may intervene, it enjoys all of the rights of a party at the
district court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and introduce documents, and the like."); id.
at 1210 n.133 (discussing cases).
'0

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)). Windsor challenged
Section 3 of DOMA which amended the federal definition of "marriage" and "spouse" in Title 1, § 7 of
the United States Code so that "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
12Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683-89. See Part III below.
"'

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683-89. See Part III below.

14See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-89 ("The [DOJ] did not oppose limited intervention by BLAG. The

District Court denied BLAG's motion to enter the suit as of right, on the rationale that the United States
already was represented by the [DOJ]. The District Court, however, did grant intervention by BLAG as
an interested party."); Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]he
DOJ asks that BLAG's involvement be limited to making substantive arguments in defense of Section 3
of DOMA while the DOJ continues to file all procedural notices."); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1210-11
("The [DOJ] has taken the view that only the [E]xecutive [B]ranch may represent the United States in
litigation, or... that any intervention by Congress should be limited to presenting arguments in defense
of a statute's constitutionality.").
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refusing to pay a tax refund to the challenger. 5 Additionally, the majority
acknowledged that briefs filed by House of Representatives leadership supporting
the constitutionality of DOMA supplied the necessary adverseness in the case
given the Executive's view that DOMA was unconstitutional.16 The majority did
not fully resolve the thorny issue of congressional standing in cases where a
President refuses to enforce a federal statute. 7 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
emphasized the almost exclusive role of the Executive Branch in defending federal
laws pursuant to Article II's Take Care Clause, squarely rejected congressional
standing, and argued that no party had standing to appeal in Windsor because the
Executive agreed with the district court's judgment holding Section 3
unconstitutional." Yet even Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion did not challenge
the authority of Congress to represent itself in separation of powers cases involving
its institutional authority. 9 By contrast, Justice Alito's dissenting opinion would
have expressly recognized the authority and standing of the leaders of either House
to defend any federal statute that the President does not defend.2 °
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion partially accepted the Obama
Administration's nuanced approach to the role of Congress in defending statutes

"5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-89. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion. Id. at 2681.
16 Id. at

2684-89.

"7 Id.; see Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 622 (observing that Windsor did not decide the
Congressional standing issue).
"8 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2698-2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in full. Id. at 2681. Chief Justice Roberts joined only the standing portion, Part 1, of
Scalia's dissenting opinion, but not his discussion of the merits, as the Chief Justice filed a separate
dissenting opinion on the merits. Id. at 2681 (listing opinions); id. at 2696-97 (Roberts, J., dissenting);
id. at 2697-2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"9Id at 2700 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[In Chadha] the Justice Department's refusal to defend the
legislation was in accord with its longstanding (and entirely reasonable) practice of declining to defend
legislation that in its view infringes upon Presidential powers."); Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 623
("[N]o Justice in Windsor challenged the power of the House or the Senate to sometimes stand in for the
[E]xecutive and defend federal statutes.").
20 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting). But see Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 574,

625-32 (arguing that the Take Care Clause gives the Executive exclusive authority to defend federal
laws, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce a
law and also contending that bicameral principles in the Constitution bar one House of Congress from
defending a challenged federal statute). Justice Thomas joined only Parts 11and III of Justice Alito's
dissenting opinion on the merits, but not Part I on standing. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681 (listing
opinions); id. at 2711-20 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the Executive Branch believes are unconstitutional, which made fine distinctions
between Article III and prudential standing in assessing the respective roles of the
Executive Branch and Congress in the DOMA litigation. 21 Unlike Justice Alito's
dissenting opinion, 22 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Windsor did not
formally recognize the authority of Congress or either House to stand in lieu of the
Executive Branch when it refuses to defend the constitutionality of a statute. 23 Yet,
by acknowledging that congressional participation could supply the necessary
adverseness to litigate a case when the Executive Branch agrees with the challenger
that a statute is unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy's opinion likely will pave the
way for increased congressional participation in unusual cases where the Executive
Branch believes a statute is unconstitutional, but at least one House of Congress
wishes to defend the statute's constitutionality. 24 Because of the strong dissenting
argument by Justice Scalia that Article II's Take Care Clause gives the President
almost exclusive authority to defend federal statutes, the Court arguably will not
fully adopt Justice Alito's full congressional standing theory when it is easier to
recognize congressional participation in a "middle" situation where the Executive
25
nominally enforces a statute it refuses to defend.
Part I discusses the basics of Article III and prudential standing. Part II
examines whether the Executive Branch has a duty to defend statutes it believes are
unconstitutional; whether Congress may intervene if the Executive refuses to
defend a statute; and President Obama's middle approach of enforcing but not
defending DOMA § 3. Part III discusses the background to the DOMA litigation
and lower court decisions in Windsor. Part IV explores the reasoning behind the
majority opinion in Windsor. Part V discusses Justice Scalia's strong defense of
Executive prerogative and rejection of congressional standing. Finally, Part VI
examines Justice Alito's proposed theory of congressional standing where the
leadership of one House wishes to defend a statute that the Executive Branch
refuses to defend.

21 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-89.

22Id. at 2712-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
23Id. at 2684-89 (majority opinion).
24

Id.

25 Id. at 2698-2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 574, 625-32

(arguing that the Take Care Clause gives the Executive exclusive authority to defend federal laws, thus
excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce a law).
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INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL
26
STANDING

A.

ConstitutionalArticle HI Standing

Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that plaintiffs possess
"standing" to file suit in the federal courts, the United States Supreme Court has
inferred from Article III's limitation of judicial decisions to "Cases" and
"Controversies" 27 that federal courts must utilize standing requirements to ensure
that plaintiffs have a genuine interest and stake in the case.28 The federal courts
have jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can prove standing for
each form of relief sought.29 A federal court must dismiss a case without deciding
the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet the constitutional standing test.30
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional principles. The
standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory opinions.31 Standing

26 The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing articles cited above under the

asterisk on page 1.
27 See

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,

arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
28 Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339-41 (2006) (explaining why the Court infers that

Article III's case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations); Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the Article III standing requirement in a Supreme Court case for
the first time); Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary
Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Testfor States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1701, 170910 (2008). But see Am. Bottom Conservancy v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652,
655-56 (7th Cir. 2011) (questioning whether standing is based on Article I1 requirements and citing
academic literature). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separationof Powers, and Standing,
59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1023, 1036-38 (2009) (discussing the debate over whether the Constitution
implicitly requires standing to sue).
29DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-54; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief
sought."); Mank, supra note 28, at 1710.
30 See

Daimler Chrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-44; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e have an

obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the litigation.");
Mank, supra note 28, at 1710.
"' Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) ("Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of
federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' Accordingly, [t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
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requirements, moreover, support separation of powers principles, which define the

division of powers between the judiciary and political branches of government so
that the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society."' 32 There is disagreement, however, regarding the
extent to which separation of powers principles limit Congress' authority to

authorize standing to sue in federal court for private citizens challenging alleged
Executive Branch under-enforcement or nonenforcement of congressional
33
requirements mandated in a federal statute.
With respect to standing, the Court requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) that she
has "suffered an injury-in-fact" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or
imminent," as opposed to "conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) the existence of "a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of," meaning the
injury must be "fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant," as
opposed to the result of the "independent action of some third party not before the
court"; and (3) that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision."34 The plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing all three prongs of the standing test.35

court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Federal courts may not decide questions that
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them or give opinion[s] advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32 Daimler Chrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-42 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), partially

abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)); Mank,
supra note 28, at 1710.
3 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (arguing that courts
should not use standing doctrine as "a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power"); infra Part
IV (discussing Justice Kennedy's views on to what extent Congress may define Article I standing

injuries). Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992) (concluding that
Article I and Article II limit Congress' authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a
concrete injury), with id.at 602 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "principal effect" of
Justice Scalia's restrictive approach to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at
the expense-not the Courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates").
34 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Bradford C. Mank, Standingfor
Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable Standing CausationDoes Not Require Proximate
Causation,2012 MICH.ST. L. REV. 869, 876 (2012).

5Daimler Chrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must "carry the
burden of establishing their standing under Article HI"); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (stating that parties
LARRY
asserting federal jurisdiction must carry the burden of establishing standing under Article III);
W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 336 (3d ed. 2009); Mank, supranote 28, at 1710.
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The Uncertaintiesof PrudentialStanding

In addition to Article III standing requirements, federal courts may impose
prudential standing requirements to limit unreasonable demands on finite judicial
resources or for other judicial policy reasons. 6 The Court has explained the
prudential standing doctrine as follows:
Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the
standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing encompasses "the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in
the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
37
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.

36 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (describing the "zone of interests" standard

as a "prudential limitation" rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements are based "in policy, rather than purely
constitutional, considerations"); YACKLE, supra note 35, at 318 (stating that prudential limitations are
policy-based "and may be relaxed in some circumstances").
" Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 469 U.S.
737, 751 (1984), partially abrogatedby Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1337 (2014)). Professor Meier summarized the Court's pre-Lexmark prudential standing doctrine as
follows:
The Court has been less precise in identifying prudential standing
requirements, but the most commonly recognized are: (1) the requirement
that a plaintiff's grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee
invoked in the suit," Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); (2) the
requirement that a plaintiff "must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); and (3) a prohibition
against "'generalized grievance[s]' shared in a substantially equal measure by
all or a large class citizens[.]" [lid. More recently, however, the Court has
tended to articulate the prohibition against generalized grievances as deriving
from Article III rather than prudential concerns. See, e.g., Hein [v. Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc.], 551 U.S. [587,] 597-98 [(2007)] ("We have
consistently held that [the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that
Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution] is too
generalized and attenuated to support Article III standing."); [Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 573-74] ("We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government-claiming only harm to his
and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does
the public at large-does not state an Article III case or controversy.").
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The Court's prudential standing doctrine is arguably less defined and more
open to interpretation than its constitutional standing doctrine.38 In Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "we
have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing
doctrine."39 In Newdow, the Court dismissed an Establishment Clause suit brought
by the father of an elementary school student challenging the constitutionality of a
school district's policy requiring teacher-lead recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
because of prudential standing concerns about the appropriateness of federal courts
"entertain[ing] a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family
law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse
40
effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed standing. ' In his
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas, complained that the majority invented a novel prudential standing
principle based on "ad hoc improvisations" to dismiss a troublesome case rather
than developing "general principles" for the doctrine of prudential standing. 41 The
Newdow decision demonstrates that there is considerable disagreement on the
42
Court about how to apply prudential standing principles.
Additionally, the line between constitutional Article III standing and
prudential standing is often unclear.43 Some commentators argue that the Court's

Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understandthe Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1241, 1243 n.4 (2011).
" See Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future
Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (2011) (describing the prudential standing doctrine as "a
malleable framework").
39

Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12.

4 Id. at 17-18. The child's mother, who was the custodial parent, intervened to dismiss the complaint
and there were complex issues based in California family law about the father's right to influence his
daughter's ,religious upbringing. Id at 13-17. As a result of these family law issues, a majority
concluded that the Court should prudentially avoid a case involving family law matters defined by
California domestic relations law. Id. at 12-18.
41Id. at 18-25 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
42See Bradford, supra note 38, at 1079-80.

3 Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability,22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692-93 (1990)
(arguing that the Court's distinction between prudential and constitutional standing is often arbitrary);
Craig A. Stem, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a
Prudential Test of FederalStanding to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2008) (arguing
that the Court sometimes shifts the line between prudential and constitutional standing, especially in
generalized grievances cases).
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distinction between Article III and prudential standing rests only on the Court's
arbitrary decision to classify an issue as constitutional or prudential for its
convenience without any genuine logical basis." For example, the Court's first
major case denying taxpayer standing, Massachusetts v. Mellon, held that an
individual taxpayer generally cannot sue the government to challenge how tax
dollars are appropriated because the taxpayer's generalized interest in government
funds "is shared with millions of others, is comparatively minute and
indeterminable, and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the
funds, [is] so remote, fluctuating[,] and uncertain."45 In its subsequent Flast v.
Cohen decision, the Court acknowledged that the Mellon decision could be read to
rely on either the Article III or prudential standing doctrine to deny standing, but
the Flast decision preferred to read Mellon as using prudential or policy reasons to
deny taxpayer standing.46 Even today, the Court has not clearly explained whether
the general prohibition against taxpayer suits is based on constitutional or
prudential considerations,4" although recent Court decisions have emphasized
48
constitutional barriers to taxpayer standing.
In a law review article written when he was a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Antonin Scalia
questioned the very existence of "the so-called 'prudential limitations of standing'
allegedly imposed by the Court itself, subject to elimination by the Court or by

Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 692 ("But what makes some requirements constitutional and the
others prudential? For example, why are injury, causation, and redressability deemed constitutionally
mandated, but the rules against third party standing and generalized grievance merely prudential? None
are mentioned in the Constitution. All are created by the Court because they are viewed as prudent limits
on federal judicial power. Each is of quite recent origin. So what makes some constitutional and the
others prudential? The only apparent answer sounds terribly cynical: a requirement is constitutional if
the Court says it is, and it is prudential if the Court says it is that. Nothing in the content of the doctrines
explains their constitutional or prudential status."). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500
(1975) (explaining the reasoning for prudential rules against third party standing and generalized
grievances).
4

"5Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-89 (1923).
46

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-94 (1968); Solimine, supra note 28, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast

interpreted the Mellon decision as a prudential rather than constitutional standing case).
4' Anne Abramowitz, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts Can Learn from California's

Taxpayer Standing,98 CALIF. L. REv. 1595, 1605-07 (2010).
48 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441-49 (2011) (discussing Article III

barriers to taxpayer standing).

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) e DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.318
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY

PAGE

114

OF

PITTSBURGH

I VOL.

76

LAW

REVIEW

I 2014

Congress. '49 He commented, "[p]ersonally, I find this bifurcation [between
prudential and constitutional standing] unsatisfying-not least because it leaves
unexplained the Court's source of authority for simply granting or denying
standing as its prudence might dictate."50 Instead, Scalia suggested that federal
courts should eliminate the prudential standing doctrine and hear all cases for
which there is constitutional standing: "[A]s I would prefer to view the matter, the
Court must always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal
right."'" As a member of the Court, Justice Scalia has not directly called for the
abolition of prudential standing,52 but in cases where the line between
constitutional and prudential standing is debatable, he appears to prefer to classify
issues as constitutional rather than prudential. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation,Incorporated,Justice Scalia argued, in a concurrence joined by Justice
Thomas, that the Court should overrule Flastand squarely hold that the bar against
taxpayer standing is constitutional and not just prudential.53 In a 2014 decision,
Lexmark International, Incorporated v. Static Control Components,
54
Incorporated,
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, significantly
changed the prudential standing doctrine by holding that limitations on
"generalized grievances" suits, including presumably taxpayer suits, are based on
Article III standing requirements and not the prudential standing principles relied
upon in some of the Court's previous cases.55

4 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation ofPowers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983); see also Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner's "Practical"Theory
of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer's Approach to Standing Than Justice Scalia 's, 50 Hous. L. REV.
71, 106 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia's 1983 standing article's criticism of prudential standing
doctrine).
" Scalia, supra note 49, at 885; see also Mank, supra note 49, at 106.
51Id.
52Mank, supra note 49, at 106.

5 Hein, 551 U.S. at 618-37, 634 n.5; accord Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(reiterating his view in Hein that the Court should overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on
constitutional grounds); see also Solimine, supra note 28, at 1045.
14134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
55

Id. at 1387 & n.3.
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Article III Standing Requirements May Not Be Waived, But
PrudentialStanding May Be Waived

At the time of Windsor and before the 2014 decision in Lexmark, the Court
distinguished between mandatory Article III standing requirements5 6 and
discretionary, court-imposed prudential standing requirements.5 7 The distinction
between Article III standing and prudential standing matters because the Court has
treated Article III requirements as fundamental and unwaivable, but has allowed
the waiver of its prudential policies. In 1984, the Court declared in Allen v. Wright
that Article III standing is "perhaps the most important" of the case-or-controversy
58
doctrines, which include "'mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like."'
The Court in Allen suggested that Article III standing is, as a "core component" of
standing "derived directly from the Constitution," more important than prudential
standing doctrines, stating:
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise
of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising
another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected
by the law invoked.... The requirement of standing, however, has a core
component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief 59

In Alliance for EnvironmentalRenewal, Incorporatedv. Pyramid Crossgates

Company, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted
Allen as treating Article III standing as "[m]ore fundamental than judicially

56See Part L.A above.

5 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12. See Part I.A below.
58 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (citation omitted); see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid

Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing Allen's emphasis that Article III standing is
the most important of the case-or-controversy doctrines).
59Allen,

468 U.S. at 751 (citations omitted); accord Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for

Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("[The Article Ill] requirement states a
limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called 'prudential'
considerations."); see also Alliance, 436 F.3d at 85 (discussing Allen's suggestion that Article III
standing is more important than prudential standing).

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.318
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY

PAGE

OF

PITTSBURGH

1 16 1 VOL.

76

LAW

REVIEW

I 2014

imposed, prudential limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 60 Accordingly,
the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife declared that neither Congress nor
federal courts may waive the Article III requirement of a concrete injury:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in
ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role
of the Third Branch--one of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases"
and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of the political
branches. "The province of the court," as Chief Justice Marshall said in
[Marbury v. Madison] .... "is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."
Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government
observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the
Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether the public interest in
proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies' observance of a
particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual
right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for
that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to
sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance
we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to
convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance
with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, "to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department," ... and to become "virtually continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness of Executive action." We have always rejected that
61
vision of our role[.]

On the other hand, because prudential standing is less fundamental than
Article III standing, the Court has held that Congress may enact legislation to
override prudential limitations, although a statute must "expressly negate[]" such
limitations. 62 The requirement of express statutory language to override the Court's

' Alliance, 436 F.3d at 85.
61Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
62 Bennett,

520 U.S. at 162-66 (1997) (explaining that "unlike their constitutional counterparts,
[prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress," prudential limitations must
be "expressly negated," and concluding that a citizen suit provision abrogated the zone of interest

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) e DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.318
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

WINDSOR

&

CONGRESSIONAL

STANDING

PAGE

1 17

prudential standing rules probably does not require the extraordinary specificity
demanded by a clear rule of statutory construction.63 Additionally, the Court has
stated that federal courts may waive prudential policies in some circumstances, and
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Windsor strongly relied on the ability of
courts to waive the usual prudential policy requiring the presence of adverse parties
to find standing despite the Obama Administration's avowed approval of the
district court's decision holding Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. 64 In
Lexmark, the Court held that the usual prohibition against generalized grievances
derives from Article III standing concerns rather than the prudential concerns cited
in earlier cases; held that the zone of interests test is a separate doctrine about who
Congress intends to allow to sue pursuant to each federal statute and not a part of
prudential standing considerations; and left open whether limitations on third-party
suits are based upon prudential or other considerations.65 While Lexmark
significantly changed the prudential standing doctrine, it seems unlikely that the
Court will repudiate its discussion of prudential considerations in Windsor because
that case was decided only one year before Lexmark and the Court's membership
was the same in both cases.

II. WHY THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO
ENFORCE DOMA AFTER IT REFUSED TO DEFEND IT
A.

The Debate Over Whether the Executive Branch May Refuse
to Defend the Constitutionalityof FederalStatutes

Some scholars argue that the President has a duty under Article II's Take Care
Clause to enforce a statute the President believes is unconstitutional, but others
contend that the President has a duty not to defend such a statute. 66 Some
commentators suggest that the Executive Branch has a near mandatory duty to
enforce all duly-enacted federal statutes pursuant to the President's obligation

limitation); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons. A Risk-Based Approach to Standing,

36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 676 & n.53 (2009).
63YACKLE, supra note 35, at 386 n.493.
4United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687-89 (2013).
65Lexmark Int'l, 134 S. Ct. at 1386-88 &n.3.

66CompareCORWIN, supra note 7, at 72 (arguing that the President has a duty to enforce a statute he or
she believes is unconstitutional), and Gressman, supra note 7, at 382-84 (same but acknowledging "the
Executive can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly
instituted"), with Devins & Prakash, supra note 8, at 509-10, 512-13 (arguing that the President should
not defend or enforce a statute he or she believes is unconstitutional).
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under the Take Care Clause, and that any refusal to do so can be interpreted as a
presidential attempt to assert nonexistent authority to repeal by fiat a validly
enacted statute. 67 Some commentators imply that the Constitution only allows a
President to object to a statute's constitutionality through the veto authority, but
requires the President to enforce any enacted law. 68 Other commentators
acknowledge that a President may refuse to defend statutes contrary to "clear"
Supreme Court precedent, although they may disagree about what constitutes
"clear" precedent. 69 Additionally, different considerations arguably apply regarding
whether the Executive defends a statute in a trial court where it may be essential to
create a record explaining the justification for the law's enactment, and whether the
Executive must appeal a district court's determination that a statute is
70
unconstitutional.
A serious objection to the absolutist position that a president must enforce
every law without regard to personal views concerning the law's legality or
constitutionality is the "departmentalist" theory that each branch of government has
independent constitutional interpretive authority to determine which governmental
actions are lawful. 71 In particular, the president must exercise discretion in deciding

67 CORWIN,

supra note 7, at 72; Gressman, supra note 7, at 382-84 (acknowledging that "the Executive

can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly
instituted"); see also Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1193 (explaining the absolutist approach to presidential
enforcement of statutes).
68CORWIN, supranote 7, at 72; Gressman, supra note 7, at 382-84 (acknowledging that "the Executive
can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly
instituted"); see also Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1193 (explaining the absolutist approach to presidential
enforcement of statutes); Curt Levey & Kenneth A. Klukowski, Take Care Now: Stare Decisis and the
President'sDuty to DefendActs of Congress, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 377, 379-83, 406-24 (2014)
(arguing Article II's Take Care Clause imposes a strong duty on a President to defend federal statutes
except if the statute encroaches on Executive authority or if the statute is "transparently
unconstitutional").
69 Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 580 n.36; Levey & Klukowski, supra note 68, at 409-12 (arguing

Article 11's Take Care Clause imposes a strong duty on a President to defend federal statutes, unless the
statute is "transparently unconstitutional").
7 Gorod, supra note 2, at 1212-15.
7 Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 509-10, 512-13, 522, 526-32 (arguing that the President has
significant interpretive authority as the head of Executive Department); Greene, supra note 8, at 579-81
(same); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1187-98 (discussing departmentalism, but observing that the theory
has more impact on academics than Executive officials, who generally defend and enforce federal laws
despite doubts about their constitutionality). Some proponents of "departmentalism" would argue that
the President may ignore even a constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court; some argue that the
Executive need only obey an actual court judgment or order, but others believe that the Executive is
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how to perform the constitutional duty to take care that the laws of the United
States are faithfully executed.72 Furthermore, there is long historical practice within
the Executive Branch of not defending or enforcing laws it believes are
unconstitutional, especially those which infringe upon presidential authority.73
Additionally, some commentators have argued that the President has a normative
duty not to defend or to enforce a statute he or she believes is unconstitutional
because the President's constitutional oath forbids the President from executing
constitutional laws, because it is better for courts trying to decide constitutional
questions to hear the President's real opinion about a law's constitutionality, and
because supporters of the law are more likely to provide a good defense.74
Some commentators argue that the defense of a law is different from the
Executive Branch's exclusive role in enforcing a law. 75 Brianne Gorod argues that

bound by the Court's interpretive authority. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 526-32 (arguing
that the President's interpretive authority is equal to the other two branches and that the Executive must
only obey an actual court judgment); Gorod, supra note 2, at 1207, 1236-37 (discussing stronger and
weaker approaches to presidential interpretive authority); Greene, supra note 8, at 581 (same and
arguing that the Executive must only obey an actual court judgment). Even if a President must
ultimately follow the constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court, however, the Executive has
some discretion in deciding whether to defend a statute whose constitutionality has not yet been decided
by the Court. Gorod, supra note 2, at 1207, 1236-37; Greene, supra note 8, at 580-81.
72Greene, supra note 8, at 579-81.

13 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 5 (citing various cases, Executive opinions, and historical
materials supporting the Executive's refusal in at least some cases to enforce federal laws and
specifically observing that the President "has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional
provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the presidency. Where the [P]resident
believes that an enactment unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the authority to defend his office
and decline to abide by it, unless he is convinced that the Court would disagree with his assessment");
see also Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1196-1208 (discussing the historical practice of the Executive Branch
to not enforce some statutes, especially those unconstitutionally infringing upon presidential authority);
Levey & Klukowski, supra note 68, at 407-09 (arguing Article HI's Take Care Clause imposes a strong
duty on a President to defend federal statutes but that an exception to the duty to defend is justified if a
statute encroaches on the President's Executive authority).
74Devins & Prakash, supranote 5, at 509-10, 512-13, 521-32, 571-74; see also Gorod, supranote 2, at
1206 ("[T]he Executive Branch should not defend challenged statutes when it believes that the statute is
at 1260 (same).
unconstitutional, or even has questions about the statute's constitutionality."); id.
71Gorod, supra note 2, at 1219-21; Shane, supra note 8 ("In analyzing this question, it's important to
distinguish two very different things: the [E]xecutive duty to carry out the law and the president's duty
to defend statutes challenged in court. On the first matter, attorneys general have long set a very high bar
before opining that the [E]xecutive [B]ranch can decline to carry out the law.... Defending laws in
court is a different matter ... the [E]xecutive is not claiming to have the final say on legal
implementation-or even interpretation."); see also Greene, supra note 8, at 592 (contending that, if
Congress sues for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a law, Congress is not "controlling
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"[e]nforcing the law requires the Executive Branch to make determinations about
how the law should be implemented and what it should look like in practice,"
whereas defending the law "does not focus on the operation of the law and
generally will not affect its operation at all."176 Some judges and commentators who
believe that Article I requires a President to enforce the law acknowledge that the
President may refuse to defend that same law.77 By contrast, Professor Tara Leigh
Grove argues that the President lacks Article III standing to invoke federal
jurisdiction or to appeal a case upon refusal under Article 1I's Take Care Clause to
defend a federal statute on behalf of the government or United States, and that the
President lacks any independent or separate institutional authority as head of the
Executive Branch to intervene in a case upon refusal to defend the interests of the
United States.

78

If the defense of federal laws is not an exclusive Executive function, it is
arguably legitimate for Congress or other agents, such as court-appointed private
79
attorneys, to defend a federal law that the President refuses to defend.
Furthermore, if a President is unenthusiastic about defending a particular statute,
Congress, a House of Congress, or a court-appointed private attorney might
provide a better defense of the law.8" It might be necessary for a court to appoint a

the execution of law"). But see Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 582-83 ("Litigation over the meaning
and constitutionality of federal statutes is a crucial part of the execution of federal law."); id. at 624-29
(rejecting the argument that defending a statute is different from enforcing it and arguing that only the
Executive may defend federal statutes).
76 Gorod, supra note 2, at 1219-20.
" Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (1986) (criticizing the

argument that a President may refuse to enforce a statute as "dubious at best," but acknowledging the
Executive's "undisputed" authority to "even refuse to defend in court, statutes which he regards as
unconstitutional"); Gorod, supra note 2, at 1219-21; Gressman, supra note 7, at 382-84 (arguing that
the President has a constitutional duty to enforce all federal laws but acknowledging that "the Executive
can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly instituted").
" Grove, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3-39, 52-58). Professor Grove places some limits on her argument
that a president lacks Article III standing to invoke federal jurisdiction if he or she refuses to defend a
statute by observing: But I do not claim that the executive has a duty to defend federal laws when
another party invokes federal jurisdiction (at trial or on appeal), nor do I attempt to determine whether
the executive has a duty to enforce some (or all) federal laws. Those are important Article I1questions,
but they are not questions of standing. Id. (manuscript at 5).
" Gorod, supra note 2, at 1247-55; Rider-Longmaid, supra note 8, at 308, 311; see also Devins &
Prakash, supra note 5, at 572, 574 (arguing that a law's proponents or beneficiaries should defend the
statute rather than an unwilling President).
80 Gorod, supra note 2, at 1239-55; Rider-Longmaid, supra note 8, at 308, 311; see also Devins &

Prakash, supra note 5, at 572, 574 (arguing that a law's proponents or beneficiaries should defend the
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private attorney to defend a statute because Congress' willingness to defend a
particular statute is often driven by partisan considerations, and Congress or a
House of Congress has only occasionally sought to defend federal laws that the
DOJ declined to defend." Most of the relatively rare cases in which Congress or a
House of Congress files suit involve some type of direct institutional conflict
83
82
between Congress and the President. The most notable case was INS v. Chadha,
which was extensively discussed in both the majority and the two main dissenting
opinions in Windsor.84 Each year, a handful of individual members of Congress or
small groups of members file amicus briefs in the Supreme Court on a wide range
of issues, but their briefs appear to carry little weight as far as affecting Court
decisions in the absence of the endorsement of Congress as an institution or a
House of Congress.8 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Windsor implies that federal
courts should give more weight to amicus briefs filed by Congress as an institution
or a House of Congress, at least in circumstances where the Executive does not
86
defend a federal statute.
Even accepting the general premise that the Executive Branch should not
robotically defend statutes it believes are unconstitutional, there is a question
whether Congress or the federal courts would have the opportunity to review or

statute rather than an unwilling President). But see Grove, supra note 9 (manuscript at 56) (rejecting the
argument that the Executive Branch would do a poor job of defending a statute opposed by a President
because "the institutional culture and traditions of the [DOJ]" lead to effective defense of statutes that

the President "deems invalid").
s Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 551-55 ("[W]e could only locate three post-1978 episodes where

lawmakers took meaningful aim at the DOJ's failure to enforce or defend federal statutes"); Frost, supra
note 2, at 947-50 (observing that Congress rarely intervenes in litigation and also arguing that
congressional litigation is often more driven by partisan considerations than institutional prerogatives);
Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 595 ("From December 1975 to May 2011, the DOJ notified Congress
that it would not defend provisions of seventy-five statutes. In only five of these cases did either
chamber step in to defend the federal law (sometimes as amicus, sometimes as intervenor).").
82

Frost, supra note 2, at 946-47 (reviewing small number of empirical studies of amicus briefs by

individual members of Congress and finding that they appear to have little impact on Supreme Court
decisions).
81INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14See Parts IV-VI below.
" Frost, supra note 2, at 946-47 (reviewing a small number of empirical studies of amicus briefs by
individual members of Congress and finding that they appear to have little impact on Supreme Court
decisions).
86 See Part IV below.
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challenge the Executive Branch's assessment of unconstitutionality.8 7 A middle
position is that the Executive Branch should not defend an obviously
unconstitutional statute, but that it may be appropriate for the Executive Branch to
nominally enforce a possibly constitutional statute, even if the President personally
believes it is unconstitutional, to preserve adequate judicial review and an
opportunity for Congress or either House to weigh in on any litigation."t As
discussed infra, one persuasive reason for encouraging the Executive Branch to
enforce a potentially unconstitutional statute is because the law is unclear whether
Congress or either House of Congress has the authority or Article III standing to
defend a statute that the President refuses to defend.89 As discussed below in Part
II.C, the Obama Administration and Attorney General Eric Holder adopted a
middle approach in the Windsor litigation by continuing to enforce DOMA Section
3 despite their view that the provision was unconstitutional.9" Professor Grove,
however, argues "that the [E]xecutive's enforcement obligation carries with it a
duty to defend" because "the [E]xecutive has standing to file suit and appeal-not
on its own behalf but as the representative of the United States." 91
B.

The ComplicatedIssue ofLegislative Standing

Regardless of the debate regarding whether a President ought to refuse to
enforce a law that he or she believes is unconstitutional, it is undisputed that the
Executive Branch has, on some occasions, refused to enforce or defend a duly
enacted statute. 92 In some cases, there may not be a private litigant with standing to

7Greene, supranote 8, at 580-82.
85 Id. at 581 ("My arguments against interpretive obligation are not arguments against judicial review,

and inter-branch interpretive dialogue is enhanced when the President gives the courts an opportunity to
weigh in on his (non)enforcement decisions based on his reading of the Constitution."); Meltzer, supra
note 2, at 1199-1205 (arguing that it is appropriate for the Executive Branch to decline to defend a
statute that is clearly unconstitutional, but acknowledging that more difficult questions are raised in rare
cases where the Executive refuses to defend a statute that has plausible arguments for constitutionality).
" See Greene, supra note 8, at 582-98 (arguing Congress or either House has standing to defend a
statute that the president refuses to defend, but acknowledging counterarguments); Meltzer, supra note
2, at 1209-13 ("[l]t is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may intervene as a party or
simply file a brief as an amicus and whether, if it may intervene, it enjoys all of the rights of a party at
the district court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and introduce documents, and the
like."); id.
at 1210-11 n.133 (discussing cases).
9oSee Part I.C below.
91Grove, supra note 9, at 20-21.
92 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1196-1208 (discussing the Executive Branch's historical practice of

declining to enforce some statutes).

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) a DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.318
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

WINDSOR

&

CONGRESSIONAL

STAND ING

PAGE

I 23

challenge the President's refusal to enforce the statute. For example, if President
Obama grants tax benefits to same-sex couples despite contrary language in
Section 3 of DOMA, private taxpayer suits challenging allegedly excessive
expenditures or tax benefits are generally prohibited as impermissible generalized
grievances under Article III standing doctrine, except perhaps in the rare
circumstance that the government allegedly favors a particular religious group over
other religions. 93 Whether Congress has Article III standing to sue when the
Executive refuses to enforce a federal statute on grounds that it is unconstitutional
raises complicated questions. 94 For example, it might make a difference whether
Congress or a House of Congress is the party filing suit, rather than individual
members.95 Additionally, some important legislative standing cases have involved
state or territorial legislators, and it is not always clear how such cases analogize to
situations where Congress is involved. 96
In 1939, the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller held that twenty Kansas
state senators could file a mandamus action against the Secretary of the Kansas
Senate to contest whether the state Senate had in fact ratified the Child Labor
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.97 It was undisputed that there had been a
twenty-to-twenty tie vote in the Kansas senate regarding passage of the proposed
Amendment, and that the Lieutenant Governor (the presiding officer of the Kansas
Senate) had broken the tie by voting in favor of the Amendment.9" The twenty state
senators who voted against the Amendment argued that amendments to the Federal

9 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441-49 (discussing Article III barriers to taxpayer standing).

9" See Greene, supra note 8, at 582-98 (arguing Congress or either House has standing to defend a
statute that the president refuses to defend, but acknowledging counterarguments); Meltzer, supra note

2, at 1209-13 ("[I]t is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may intervene as a party or
simply file a brief as an amicus and whether, if it may intervene, it enjoys all of the rights of a party at
the district court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and introduce documents, and the
like."); id. at 1210-11 n.133 (discussing cases).

9 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997) ("We attach some importance to the fact that appellees
have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both
Houses actively oppose their suit.... We therefore hold that these individual members of Congress do
not have a sufficient 'personal stake' in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to
have established Article III standing.").
I See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435-46 (1939) (involving a vote in the Kansas
legislature); Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 542-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving a bill passed by

the Guam territorial legislature).
9 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438-46.
9

Id. at 436-38.
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Constitution must be enacted by state legislators only and that state executive
officials may not vote on proposed amendments. 99 After finding that it had
jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled on the merits that the
Amendment was validly enacted because the Lieutenant Governor was authorized
to cast the deciding vote on the proposed amendments.' 0 After granting certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, concluded
that the twenty state senators had standing to sue because the case was different
from a mere taxpayer suit alleging a generalized grievance about alleged illegal
expenditures. The Court noted that the circumstances were more similar to prior
decisions that allowed state officials challenging a state statute as illegal under the
Federal Constitution.10 ' The Chief Justice wrote:
We find no departure from principle in recognizing in the instant case that at
least the twenty senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained, would
have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the proposed constitutional
amendment, have an interest in the controversy which, treated by the state court
as a basis for entertaining and deciding the federal questions, is sufficient to give
10 2
the Court jurisdiction to review that decision.

In 1997, the Court in Raines v. Byrd held that, by merely holding office,
members of Congress do not have Article III standing to challenge a federal
statute's constitutionality, even if the statute purports to grant such standing, unless
the legislator can prove a personal, concrete injury from the statute's passage like
any other litigant.0 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the Line Item Veto Act harmed the
institution of Congress by unconstitutionally expanding the President's veto
authority, but the Court concluded that individual members of Congress could not
sue based on possible generalized harm to the legislature when they had not
suffered any specific personal injury."° Additionally, the Court observed that "[w]e

9 Id.The Kansas House of Representatives subsequently voted to ratify the amendment. Id. at 436.
'00Id.at 437.
101Id. at 438-46.
02

Id.at 446.

103
Raines, 521 U.S. at 821-30.
"oId.at 821, 830. By contrast, a member of Congress might be able to sue to defend his personal
interest in holding his seat in Congress. Id. at 820-21 (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
496, 512-14 (1969) (holding that a Member of Congress could sue to challenge his exclusion from the
House of Representatives and loss of his salary)).
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attach some importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both
Houses actively oppose their suit."1 °5 Accordingly, Raines did not address or
resolve: (1) whether Congress or a house of Congress has standing as an institution
to challenge or defend an allegedly unconstitutional statute; or (2) whether
Congress may enact a statute giving itself standing to challenge or defend any
allegedly unconstitutional statute (or perhaps at least statutes purportedly affecting
the institutional authority of the Legislative Branch). 0 6
The Court in Raines carefully distinguished its prior decision in Coleman and
strongly suggested it was still good law.'07 After reviewing the facts and decision in
Coleman, the Court in Raines observed:
It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands ... for the proposition
that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a
specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into
effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been
completely nullified. 108
The Court distinguished Raines from Coleman on grounds that Coleman involved
the fundamental issue of whether a purported legislative action established a valid
law or not:
[T]here is a vast difference between the level of vote nullification at issue in
Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative power that is
alleged [in Raines]. To uphold standing here would require a drastic extension of

los Id. at 829.
06

See id. at 829-30 (rejecting standing for individual members of Congress, but observing that both

Houses opposed their suit against the Line Item Veto Act).
07

1 Id. at 821-29.
o' Id. at 823 (footnote omitted). The Court in Raines explained that it was not deciding whether

Coleman could be distinguished as a case only applicable to state legislatures and not Congress because
the Kansas Supreme Court had endorsed jurisdiction in the case or because Coleman did not involve the
separation of powers issues involved in congressional suits. Id. at 824 n.8.
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Coleman. We are unwilling to take that step .... 109 [T]he institutional injury
10
they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed (contra, Coleman).'

The Court noted further that Congress could simply repeal the disputed law or
exempt appropriations bills from its reach, but refrained explicitly from deciding
whether standing would lie in cases where such repeal or exemption was not
possible."'

Thus, the Raines decision generally forecloses suits by individual

members of Congress who allege that a statute has diminished the institutional
authority of the Legislative Branch, especially where Congress may simply repeal
the disputed statute. Raines, however, potentially leaves open the possibility of a
suit regarding whether a federal statute is effective, based on an analogy to
Coleman-although Raines explicitly declined to address whether members of
Congress could file a suit similar to Coleman, or would be barred by separation of
powers concerns or other factors not applicable in Coleman, which involved state
legislators.' 12 In understanding Windsor, the Court's precedent regarding legislative
standing raises important questions, such as whether a President's refusal to
enforce a federal statute he or she believes is unconstitutional allows legislators (or
perhaps

Congress

nonenforcement,

or either House)

to invoke

Coleman to

or whether Raines bars at least individual

challenge

that

legislators from

challenging such nonenforcement." 3
After Raines, lower courts have rejected suits by individual legislators that
allege that an Executive official has improperly implemented a law, but do not
allege, as in Coleman, that the legislative process has been distorted in such a way
as to raise questions whether a law was validly enacted." 4 For example, in Russell

1

"

Id. at 826.
0

Id. at 829.

. Id. at 829-30.
112Id. at 824 n.8 (declining to decide whether a suit by federal legislators similar to Coleman would be

appropriate).
"' See Greene, supra note 8, at 584 (discussing whether Coleman or Raines apply to legislative suits

where a President refuses to enforce a federal statute).
"' See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying Raines' approach of

denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress in a case alleging that the President
violated the War Powers Act because they had a legislative remedy and therefore did not need to sue in
federal court); see also Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying Raines'
approach of denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress in a case alleging that the
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v. DeJongh, a senator in the Virgin Islands territorial legislature sued to set aside
certain judicial commissions because the governor had allegedly failed to follow
proper procedures. 15 Dismissing the case for lack of standing, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained the difference between cases like
Russell that fell within Raines' denial of legislative standing and Coleman's
recognition of standing:
The courts have drawn a distinction ...between a public official's mere
disobedience of a law for which a legislator voted-which is not an injury in
fact-and an official's distortion of the process by which a bill becomes law by
nullifying a legislator's vote or depriving a legislator of an opportunity to vote116
which is an injury in fact.
Additionally, the Third Circuit interpreted the Coleman exception for legislative
standing as applying only in cases where legislators had no effective political
remedy, such as a President's decision to terminate a treaty, or at least where a
supermajority was needed to overturn an Executive decision." 7 By contrast, similar
to Raines, the Virgin Islands legislature "was free to confirm, reject, or defer voting
on the Governor's nominees," and, therefore, there was no compelling reason to
allow a legislative member to sue in court when the political process provided an
effective remedy." 8S
In "pocket veto" cases addressing whether a President's (or territorial
governor's) inaction causes a bill to become law, lower courts have followed
Coleman to find legislative standing, notwithstanding that the Court has not
resolved doubts raised by Raines." 9 Article I, Section 7 of the Federal Constitution

President's Executive Order for protection of rivers exceeded his authority and diminished
congressional authority); see also Greene, supranote 8,at 584-85 (discussing cases).
115Russel v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2007).

.6 Id. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117Id. at 135-36, 136 n.4.
8

Id at 136.

9See Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 542-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Coleman to hold that
the Guam Governor had standing to challenge the Guam Supreme Court decision that his failure to sign
a bill resulted in a "pocket veto" preventing the bill from becoming a law); see also Chenoweth, 181
F.3d at 116-17 (concluding that prior D.C. Circuit cases finding legislative standing in"pocket veto"
cases are probably still good law because they are controlled by the Coleman decision); see also Greene,
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implicitly grants the President authority to "pocket veto" legislation in certain
circumstances when Congress is adjourned:

If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
In Kennedy v. Sampson, a pre-Raines decision, Congress passed a bill that
President Nixon neither signed nor formally vetoed. In an attempt to "pocket veto"
the bill, Nixon did, however, issue a memorandum of disapproval announcing his
decision to refrain from signing the bill. 2° Congress had adjourned within eight
days of the bill's passage, but the Senate appointed an agent to take messages from
the President to avoid a pocket veto. 21 Senator Kennedy filed suit seeking a
declaration with respect to whether the bill had become law.'22 Invoking Coleman,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
Kennedy had standing:
In the present case, appellee has alleged that conduct by officials of the
executive branch amounted to an illegal nullification not only of Congress'
exercise of its power, but also of appellee's exercise of his power. In the
language of the Coleman opinion, appellee's object in this lawsuit is to vindicate
the effectiveness of his vote. No more essential interest could be asserted by a
that the purposes of the standing doctrine
legislator. We are satisfied, therefore,
23
are fully served in this litigation.1
In 1999, the D.C. Circuit in Chenoweth v. Clinton considered whether
Kennedy was still good law in light of Raines and other cases narrowing the scope

supra note 8, at 586-88 (arguing that "pocket veto" cases fall within Coleman's legislative standing
rule).
120Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that individual members of Congress and congressional leaders had standing
in a "pocket veto" case).
'21Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432.
22

1

Id.

123Id. at

436.
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of Article III standing. 124 The court concluded that Kennedy "may survive as a
peculiar application of the narrow rule announced in Coleman"[.]' 12' The
Chenoweth decision explained:
Although Coleman could be interpreted more broadly, the Raines Court read the
case to stand only for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have
been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue
if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect) on the
ground that their votes have been completely nullified.... Even under this
narrow interpretation, one could argue that the plaintiff in Kennedy had standing.
The pocket veto challenged in that case had made ineffective a bill that both
houses of the Congress had approved. Because it was the President's veto-not a
lack of legislative support-that prevented the bill from becoming law (either
directly or by the Congress voting to override the President's veto), those in the
majority could plausibly describe the President's action as a complete
26
nullification of their votes.1
In cases where a President refuses to enforce a statute based on a personal

belief that the statute is unconstitutional, the issue remains whether courts should
follow Raines to deny legislative standing (at least in suits by individual
legislators), or Coleman to allow suits by either individual members of Congress,
Congress as an institution, or either House. One argument is that Coleman applies
to allow some types of legislative suits because the President's refusal to enforce an
allegedly unconstitutional law raises the same concern in Coleman as to the validity
of the law. 127 On the other hand, Raines interpreted Coleman as applying to a law
that "does not go into effect" because of procedural concerns about how it was
enacted.' 28 That is arguably different from a President deciding that a law that has
been in effect is now unconstitutional and no longer enforceable, perhaps in light of
evolving constitutional doctrine that would have recognized the statute as
constitutional at the time of its initial enactment. 129 Because of complexities

24Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 114-17.

125 Id.at 116.
126 Id. at 116-17 (internal quotations omitted).
127Greene, supranote 8, at 588-89.
121Raines, 521 U.S. at 823; Greene, supranote 8, at 588-89.
29Greene, supra note 8, at 588-89.
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regarding whether anyone, including Congress or either House, may challenge a
President's decision not to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional statute, the Obama
Administration in the Windsor case adopted the middle position of enforcing
Section 3 of DOMA, while at the same time announcing to Congress and the
130
federal courts that it viewed that provision to be unconstitutional.
C.

Attorney GeneralHolder's2011 DOMA Letter to Speaker
Boehner

In February 2011, United States Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to
John Boehner, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, informing
him that President Obama "made the determination that Section 3 of [DOMA], as
applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment." 1 ' While the DOJ previously
defended DOMA against legal challenges involving legally married same-sex
couples in jurisdictions where circuit courts already held that classifications based
on sexual orientation are subject to rational basis review, the Holder letter
explained that it would not defend two pending district court cases in New York
(Windsor) or Connecticut, because those two cases were "in jurisdictions without
precedent on whether sexual-orientation classifications are subject to rational basis
132
review or whether they must satisfy some form of heightened scrutiny."'
Because there was no binding precedent in the Second Circuit with respect to
the standard of scrutiny in sexual-orientation cases, President Obama and Attorney
General Holder determined that they would argue that heightened scrutiny was
appropriate and that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional in light of that
heightened scrutiny, on grounds that DOMA's legislative history indicated that
same-sex marriages were denied federal benefits available to heterosexual
marriages solely because of "moral disapproval of gays and lesbians and their
'
intimate and family relationships." 133
Holder argued that legislation based on mere
moral disapprobation of a group protected by heightened scrutiny could not survive

130See Part

n.C below.

'3 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter], available
at http://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/201 I/February/1 -ag-223.html.
132Id. (citing Windsor v. United States, No. 1: 10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y.); Pedersen v. OPM, No. 3: 10-cv-

1750 (D. Conn.)).
33

1

id.
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134
judicial review, and, therefore, the DOJ would refuse to defend the statute.
Holder further explained that, in the two pending district court cases, the DOJ
would take the position that Section 3 of DOMA was indefensible if reviewed

under heightened scrutiny, but that a reasonable argument for constitutionality
could be made if the statute was only subject to rational basis scrutiny.I3 5
Although President Obama "instructed the [DOJ] not to defend the statute" in
the two pending district court cases, and Attorney General Holder agreed with that
decision, Holder nevertheless explained that the federal government would enforce
DOMA until

Congress changed the

statute or, more

likely, federal courts

determined that it was unconstitutional, stating:

Notwithstanding this determination, the President has informed me that Section
3 will continue to be enforced by the Executive Branch. To that end, the
President has instructed Executive agencies to continue to comply with Section 3
of DOMA, consistent with the Executive's obligation to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial
branch renders a definitive verdict against the law's constitutionality. This
course of action respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA,
and it recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims
6

raised. 13

Attorney General Holder then explained the unusual circumstances in which
the DOJ declines to defend a duly-enacted federal statute, noting that:
[T]he [DOJ] has a longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality of
duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their defense, a
practice that accords the respect appropriately due to a coequal branch of
government. However, the [DOJ] in the past has declined to defend statutes
despite the availability of professionally responsible arguments, in part because
the [DOJ] does not consider every plausible argument to be a reasonable one....
[D]ifferent cases can raise very different issues with respect to statutes of
doubtful constitutional validity, and thus there are a variety of factors that bear
on whether the [DOJ] will defend the constitutionality of a statute. This is the
rare case where the proper course is to forgo the defense of this statute.

134

Id.

135

id.

136

Id.
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Moreover, the [DOJ] has declined to defend a statute in cases in which it is
manifest that the President has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional, as
137
is the case here.

Holder's approach of "declin[ing] to defend statutes despite the availability of
professionally responsible arguments, in part because the [DOJ] does not consider
every plausible argument to be a reasonable one" was contrary to the view of at
least some prior Attorneys General who had suggested that the Executive Branch
had a duty to defend a federal statute unless it was clearly unconstitutional in light
of relevant precedent or infringed on presidential authority, 13t although the position
of presidential administrations on this issue has varied significantly throughout

American history.

139

Because he was aware that the House of Representatives might disagree with
his opinion that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, Holder's letter
concluded that DOJ attorneys would "notify the courts of [the DOJ's] interest in
providing Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in
those cases."' 4 ° He also notified the House Speaker that a motion to dismiss in the
two cases would be due on March 11, 2011,141 giving the House notice if it sought
to intervene in the case. Nevertheless, Holder also explained that the DOJ "will
remain parties to the case and continue to represent the interests of the United
States throughout the litigation;"' 14 2 he probably took that position because the DOJ

...
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
.3 Id. Att'y General's Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, supra note 4, at 2-6 ("The
[DOJ] appropriately refuses to defend an act of Congress only in the rare case when the statute either
infringes on the constitutional power of the Executive or when prior precedent overwhelmingly
indicates that the statute is invalid."); Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 519-20 ("Prior [E]xecutives,
when they embraced the duty to defend, had emphasized that a defense was necessary whenever a court
might uphold a law as constitutional.... Holder's distinction between plausible and reasonable
arguments seems inconsistent with past practice."); id at 569-70 (same).
139 Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 514-20 (discussing the history of American Presidents and

Attorneys General on the question of whether the Executive Branch has a duty to defend or enforce even
constitutionally questionable federal statutes).
'4

Holder Letter, supra note 131.

141Id.

142Id.
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143
routinely argues that it should centrally control all litigation by the United States.
It is uncertain whether Congress may formally intervene as a defendant
representing the United States in litigation challenging the constitutionality of a
statute that the Executive Branch refuses to defend, or whether it may only file
amicus briefs without party rights.144

In his letter to House Speaker Boehner, Holder took the middle position of
continuing to enforce a statute that the Executive Branch regarded as
unconstitutional. 145 Holder did so in recognition that Congress was entitled to
weigh in on the President's decision and that "the judiciary [is] the final arbiter of
the constitutional claims raised."' 46 As discussed below in Section IV, Holder's
middle position enabled Justice Kennedy to find standing despite the
counterargument that standing on appeal was inappropriate once the Executive
Branch agreed with the district court's decision striking down DOMA Section 3 as
47

unconstitutional. 1

Predictably, commentators divided in their reaction to Holder's policy of
declining to defend DOMA. Some commentators praised Holder's approach of

"I Devins & Prakash, supra note 5, at 538-41 (explaining the bureaucratic imperatives leading the DOJ
to argue it should control all United States government litigation); Frost, supra note 2, at 938-39
(praising centralized control of United States litigation by the Attorney General and the DOJ).
'44Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1209-13 ("[1]t is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may
intervene as a party or simply file a brief as an amicus and whether, if it may intervene, it enjoys all of
the rights of a party at the district court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and introduce
documents, and the like. The [DOJ] has taken the view that only the [E]xecutive [B]ranch may represent
the United States in litigation, or ...that any intervention by Congress should be limited to presenting
arguments in defense of a statute's constitutionality."); see generally Matthew I. Hall, Standing of
Intervenor Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1566 (2012) ("[A]mici
have no appeal rights, while intervenor-defendants may... be entitled to appeal even when their aligned
parties elect not to.").
145Holder Letter, supra note 131.

14Id.
147Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2684-89; see Part IV below.
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enforcing the law but refusing to defend it. 141 Other commentators argued that the
Obama Administration should have defended DOMA Section 3.149

II. WINDSOR IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. A BriefHistory of Section 3 of DOMA
In 1996, Congress enacted DOMA to address the then-novel issue of samesex marriage. 50 At that time, no state recognized same-sex marriage.1l ' The Hawaii
Supreme Court in 1993, however, raised national awareness of the issue with a
plurality opinion holding that the equal protection provisions of the Hawaii State
Constitution required strict scrutiny review and presumptive unconstitutionality for
a Hawaii statute limiting marriage to heterosexual couples; the court remanded the
issue for further proceedings. 52 DOMA contains two operative sections. Section 2,

14 See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 8 (defending the Obama Administration's decision to enforce but not

to defend DOMA, noting "I don't believe that any administration is obliged to urge a court to accept
propositions that the [P]resident believes are fundamentally wrong, as surely these propositions are");
Shane, supra note 8 (defending Holder's Letter as a "careful, highly deliberate step ... consistent with
the... [E]xecutive's obligations towards the Constitution and the rule of law").
149See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, THE VOLOKH

CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grabin-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma) (criticizing the Obama Administration's decision not to defend
DOMA because "the new approach invests within DOJ a power to conduct an independent
constitutional review of the issues, to decide the main issues in the case-in this case, the degree of
scrutiny for gay rights issues-and then, upon deciding the main issue, to decide if there is a reasonable
basis for arguing the other side. If you take that view, the Executive Branch essentially has the power to
decide what legislation it will defend based on whatever views of the Constitution are popular or
associated with that Administration. It changes the role of the Executive [B]ranch in defending litigation
from the traditional dutiful servant of Congress to major institutional player with a great deal of
discretion"); Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is Wrong on DOMA, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2011,
12:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/why-obama-is-wrong-on-dom-b_827676
.html ("But now Obama has declared that if the [P]resident doesn't agree with a law-even if the courts
say it's constitutional--he can choose not to defend it. This sets a terrible precedent that could well
come back to haunt those who are cheering the [P]resident's decision.").
0 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (discussing DOMA).

Id.

151
1

Id.; Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-68 (1993) (plurality opinion) (holding that a Hawaii statute

restricting marriage to heterosexual marriage establishes sex-based classification which is subject to the
"strict scrutiny" test and presumptive unconstitutionality in an equal protection challenge pursuant to the
Hawaii Constitution and remanding for further proceedings).
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which was not challenged in Windsor, allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages performed under the laws of other states.' 53
In Windsor, the lower courts and eventually the United States Supreme Court
addressed Section 3 of DOMA, which amended the Dictionary Act in Title 1, § 7
of the United States Code to provide a federal definition of "marriage" and
"spouse." 154 Section 3 of DOMA provided:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 155

Section 3 of DOMA did not "forbid [s]tates from enacting laws permitting samesex marriages or civil unions or providing state benefits to residents in that
status."' 56 Section 3, however, provided "a comprehensive definition of marriage
for purposes of all federal statutes and other regulations or directives covered by its
terms" that forbid federal agencies from providing same-sex married couples with
the benefits and rights provided to heterosexual married couples in over one
thousand federal laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed.' 57
B.

The Windsor Litigation in the Lower Courts

In 1963, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer began a long-term same-sex
relationship. 58 In 1993, the couple registered as domestic partners when New York
City established that new right for same-sex couples.' 59 The couple continued to

153See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682-83 (discussing DOMA Section 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).

154 Id. at 2683.
1 Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
156Id.

157Id. (citing DAYNA K. SHAH, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004)).

158
Id.
159Id.
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reside in New York City but traveled to Canada to marry in 2007.16' The State of
61
New York recognized the couple's marriage as valid.1
In 2009, Spyer died and left her entire estate to Windsor. 162 Because DOMA
denied federal recognition and benefits to same-sex spouses, Windsor did not
qualify for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax, which excludes from
taxation "any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to
his surviving spouse." 163 Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes but filed a refund
request seeking full reimbursement. 1" 4 The Internal Revenue Service denied her
refund request because Windsor was not a "surviving spouse" under DOMA's
definition of marriage. 165 Windsor then filed a refund suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 66 Windsor argued that
DOMA violated her constitutional right to equal protection, as applied to the
67
federal government in the Fifth Amendment. 1
Attorney General Holder notified the district court and House Speaker
Boehner that the DOJ would not defend the constitutionality of DOMA Section 3
(while continuing to enforce it) until the federal courts decided its
constitutionality. 16 The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group ("BLAG") of the House
of Representatives, which comprises the five majority and minority leaders of the
House, voted to intervene in Windsor's case and defend Section 3 of DOMA. 169

160id.
161Id.
62

1 Id.
163Id.(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2012)).

164Id.
165Id.

166Id.
167 Id.

168See id at 2683-84; see also supraPart H.C.
169 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2684. Pursuant to the internal rules of the House of Representatives, there is

established "an Office of General Counsel for the purpose of providing legal assistance and
representation to the House.... The Office of General Counsel shall function pursuant to the direction
of the Speaker, who shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which shall include the
majority and minority leaderships." R. II,
cl. 8 of the RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 670
(The Office of General Counsel in the House of Representatives), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/HiMAN-1 12/pdf/HIAN-1 12.pdf, see Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 608-10, 614-22
(discussing the history of the House of Representatives general counsel and arguing that the counsel
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The DOJ did not oppose limited intervention by BLAG.' 70 The district court denied
BLAG's motion to intervene as of right, reasoning that the DOJ already
represented the United States.17' The district court did, however, allow BLAG to
172
intervene as an interested party.
In addressing the merits of Windsor's tax refund suit, the district court ruled
against the United States, finding DOMA Section 3 unconstitutional and ordering
the Department of the Treasury to refund the tax with interest. 173 Both the DOJ and
BLAG filed notices of appeal.1

74

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment.' 75 The Second Circuit applied heightened scrutiny to classifications
based on sexual orientation, agreeing with the DOJ and Windsor.'76 The United

operates in a partisan manner following the views of the House majority leadership); see also Frost,
supra note 2, at 943-45 (same). At the time of the Windsor litigation, the three Republican leaders in
BLAG-John A. Boehner; Eric Cantor, Majority Leader; and Kevin McCarthy, Majority Whipsupported the House's intervention to defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, but the two
Democratic leaders-Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader; and Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Whip-declined
to support the position taken by BLAG on the merits of DOMA Section 3's constitutionality in Windsor
and other cases. See generally Brief on the Merits of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House
of Representatives, U.S. v. Windsor, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 12-307 (explaining the status of the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in the parties to the proceeding section of brief) (Jan. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/ publications/supreme courtpreview/briefsv2/12-307_respondentsBLAG.authcheckdam.pdf; Press Release, Representative John Boehner,
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, House Will Ensure DOMA ConstitutionalityIs
Determined by the Court (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://boehner.house.gov/news/documentsingle
.aspx?DocumentID-=228585; Press Release, Representative Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Letter to Speaker
Boehner on House Counsel Defense of DOMA (Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://pelosi.housegov/
see
also
news/press-releases/pelosi-letter-to-speaker-boehner-on-house-counsel-defense-of-doma;
Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1212.
170 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
171Id.
172Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2)).
173Id.

174ld "
175Id.
11'

Id. In an unrelated case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also held Section 3 of

DOMA unconstitutional. Massachusetts v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. of United States House of Representatives
v. Gill, 133 S. Ct. 2884 (2013).
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States did not comply with the district court's judgment. 177 The government did not
pay a refund to Windsor, and the Executive Branch continued to enforce Section 3
of DOMA. 178 As discussed in Part II above and Part IV below, the Obama
Administration likely continued to enforce Section 3 of DOMA despite its view
that the provision was unconstitutional to maintain sufficient adverseness between
the parties for Article III standing, such that the Supreme Court could review
Windsor and decide the constitutional question presented therein. There might have
been no standing for Supreme Court review had the United States simply paid
Windsor the refund. 79
'
In granting certiorari on the question of DOMA Section 3's constitutionality,
the Supreme Court requested argument on two additional questions: (1) whether
the United States' agreement with Windsor's legal position precluded further
review; and (2) whether BLAG had standing to appeal the case.' 80 Because all
parties agreed that the Court had jurisdiction to decide Windsor, the Court
appointed Professor Vicki Jackson as amicus curiae to argue the contrary position
that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute.'81
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S MAJORITY OPINION: MAKING
ADVERSENESS A PRUDENTIAL STANDING QUESTION AND
USING BLAG's INTERVENTION AS AN ADDITIONAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR ADVERSENESS
In deciding whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear Windsor, Justice
Kennedy framed the initial question as "whether either the Government or BLAG,
or both of them, were entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeals and later to seek
certiorari and appear as parties here."' 82 He first explained that it was undisputed
that Windsor had standing to sue in district court to attempt to recover the estate
taxes on Spyer's estate because being forced to pay an allegedly unconstitutional

'77Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.

178Id.

179
See id.
at 2686 ("It would be a different case if the Executive had taken the further step of paying
Windsor the refund to which she was entitled under the District Court's ruling."); see also supra Parts
II.B-C; see also infra Part IV.
180
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
...
Id.(citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 787 (appointing Professor Vicki Jackson to submit a brief opposing
jurisdiction)).
8

12 Id.
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1 3
tax "'causes a real and immediate economic injury to the individual taxpayer."'
That the Government agreed with Windsor that DOMA Section 3 was
unconstitutional did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction "to entertain and
resolve the refund suit; for her injury (failure to obtain a refund allegedly required
184
by law) was concrete, persisting, and unredressed."'

Controversy existed, however, about "the standing of the parties, or aspiring
parties, to take an appeal in the Court of Appeals and to appear as parties in further
proceedings in this Court."' 85 Professor Jackson, in her role as the Court's
designated amicus against jurisdiction, argued for dismissal on grounds that neither
party had standing to appeal because the Executive Branch and Windsor agreed
with the District Court's decision, and, therefore, the Court of Appeals should have
86
dismissed:'
The amicus submits that once the President agreed with Windsor's legal position
and the District Court issued its judgment, the parties were no longer adverse.
From this standpoint the United States was a prevailing party below, just as
Windsor was. Accordingly, the amicus reasons, it is inappropriate for this Court
to grant certiorari and proceed to rule on the merits; for the United States seeks
187
no redress from the judgment entered against it.

Justice Kennedy disagreed with Professor Jackson's position, stating that her
argument "elide[d] the distinction between two principles: the jurisdictional
requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on its exercise."' 88 As fully
discussed in Part I, the majority opinion explained the distinction between the
"more flexible" prudential principles of judicial self-governance and appellate
procedure, and the quite different mandatory three-part Article III standing test. 8 9
Justice Kennedy's general explanation of the distinction is uncontroversial, but his
application of prudential standing principles and Article III standing rules to the

81Id. at 2684-85 (quoting Hein, 551 U.S. at 599).
14 Id. at 2685.
185
Id.
186

Id.

I7
id.
188
Id.

9 Id. at 2685-86; see Part I above.
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facts of Windsor is controversial, as is further discussed in Part IV (discussing the
majority opinion) and Part V (addressing Justice Scalia's dissent). 90
The majority opinion first concluded that "the United States retains a stake
sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal and in proceedings before this
Court."'' Justice Kennedy explained that the United States' refusal to pay the
refund ordered by the district court established a real economic injury and
controversy "sufficient" for Article III jurisdiction, despite the Executive's view
that Windsor ought to prevail.192 Justice Kennedy acknowledged, that "[i]t would
be a different case if the Executive had taken the further step of paying Windsor the
'
Thus,
refund to which she was entitled under the District Court's ruling."193
President Obama's middle position of arguing that DOMA Section 3 was
unconstitutional, but continuing to enforce it until the Supreme Court ruled on its
constitutionality, was crucial in providing the economic injury and controversy
94
necessary for Article III standing before the Court. 1
As even Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion acknowledged, 19 the strongest
case supporting Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is the Court's 1983 decision in
INS v. Chadha. 196 One interesting connection between Windsor and Chadha is that
then-Judge Kennedy wrote the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chadha,197 and the
Supreme Court's Article III standing analysis in Chadha relied in part on his
approach.198 Chadha is best known for its merits holding that separation of powers
principles in the Constitution forbid Congress from delegating a power to the
Executive Branch, such as giving Immigration and Nationality Service ("INS")

190See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686-89. But see Part V below (explaining Justice Scalia's dissenting

opinion's criticism of the majority opinion).
'9' Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
192Id.

193Id.
See supra Part H.C.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) ("The closest we have ever
come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v. Chadha.").
'9

196 Chadha,462 U.S. 919.
'9

Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980).

'9' Chadha, 462 U.S. at 939-40 ("We agree with the Court of Appeals that 'Chadha has asserted a

concrete controversy, and our decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be
deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its order and deport him."').
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judges the authority to decline to deport aliens whose visas expired, but then
allowing one or both houses of Congress to exercise a legislative veto to override
that Executive decision without going through the normal bicameral presentment
process and veto procedure in the Constitution for enacting legislation. 99 But
Chadha first had to address the question of Article III and prudential standing in a
case where the Executive Branch did not defend the constitutionality of the statute
because it diminished its authority but continued proceedings to deport Chadha
despite its views on constitutionality, and where both houses of Congress sought to
intervene as parties before the Supreme Court.200
With important parallels to the Windsor case, where the Government argued
that the statute was unconstitutional but still followed it by refusing to reimburse
estate taxes to Windsor, the Chadha court held that "the INS was sufficiently
aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting it from taking action it
would otherwise take" to be a party for appellate jurisdiction because it sought to
follow the applicable statute and legislative veto ordering the deportment of
Chadha even though the Executive Branch argued that the legislative veto requiring
it to deport him was unconstitutional. 2"' While holding that Congress had standing
and was a proper party when it intervened before the Supreme Court, the Court in
Chadhaalso held that the INS had Article III standing both at the time of the Ninth
Circuit's decision before Congress intervened and even before the Supreme Court
after Congress intervened, despite the Executive Branch's view that the statute was
unconstitutional." 2 The majority in Chadha quoted with approval then-Judge
Kennedy's Ninth Circuit opinion:
[T]he INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the
INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that "Chadha has asserted a concrete
controversy, and our decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he
will not be deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its order and
'20 3
deport him.

199See id. at 944-59.
200 See id. at 929-40.
2I See id. at 930.

202Id. at 939-40.
23 Id. (citation omitted).
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Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Windsor correctly relied upon Chadha
for the principle that "even where 'the Government largely agree[s] with the
opposing party on the merits of the controversy,' there is sufficient adverseness and
an 'adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to
enforce the challenged law against that party. '' 21 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Windsor argued convincingly that the Obama Administration's refusal to
refund Windsor's taxes created sufficient adverseness based upon Chadha's
2°5
reasoning.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion argued that the portion of Chadha
addressing the standing of the INS either only stated that the agency had standing
before the Court of Appeals or was dictum if it suggested that the INS had standing
before the Supreme Court. 2°6 He reasoned that the INS did not have standing before
the Supreme Court because it agreed with Ninth Circuit's decision holding the
statute unconstitutional; in Justice Scalia's interpretation, Congress was the only
party with standing before the Supreme Court in Chadha because it alone was
genuinely adverse to the Court of Appeals' decision. 2 7 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, however, reasoned that the Supreme Court in Chadha had appropriately
stated that the INS had standing before both the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court because the government would have followed either court's decision to
deport Chadha, despite the Executive's view that a deportation order was
unconstitutional, and, accordingly, the Executive Branch was sufficiently adverse
to Chadha to have standing before the Supreme Court.20 8 Analogously, the majority
concluded that the Executive Branch was sufficiently adverse to Windsor to have
2
standing, as it refused to pay her the tax refund ordered by the district court.

9

While acknowledging that a prevailing party "generally" is not aggrieved and
may not appeal, Justice Kennedy cited precedent that this was a flexible prudential
principle and not a mandatory Article III rule in all cases. 210 While concluding that

204 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686-87 (quoting Chadha,462 U.S. at 940 n.12).

Id.

205

206Id. at 2700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207Id.

200Id.at 2686 (majority opinion). See Part V below (comparing the majority opinion's reasoning and

Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion on whether the INS had standing in the Supreme Court in Chadha).
209Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
210

Id.at 2687 (quoting Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980)).
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the Obama Administration's middle approach of enforcing, but not defending,
DOMA Section 3 met Article III standing requirements (because Ms. Windsor
suffered an injury when the Government refused to pay her a refund after the
district court entered judgment in her favor), the Windsor majority conceded that
the Executive's approach raised prudential concerns about the need for an
adversary to present the position that the provision was constitutional.211 The
majority, however, concluded the participation of amici curiae could meet the need
for a competent adversary to argue vigorously in favor of a statute's
212
constitutionality, despite the Executive's position that it was unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Chadha, the Court concluded that any prudential concern for an
adversary arguing in favor of a statute's constitutionality was satisfied when the
Court of Appeals "invit[ed] and accept[ed] briefs from both Houses of
Congress." 2 13 By emphasizing the importance of BLAG's brief in satisfying
concerns about adversarial presentation of opposing arguments, and concluding
that congressional briefs played a similar role in Chadha, Justice Kennedy in
Windsor suggested that, in future cases, federal courts should give significant
weight to amicus briefs filed by Congress as an institution or a House of Congress,
214
at least in circumstances where the Executive does not defend a federal statute.
In Windsor, the majority concluded that "BLAG's sharp adversarial
presentation of the issues satisfies the prudential concerns that otherwise might
counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties
agree. '215 Furthermore, the majority observed that, if it dismissed Windsor for the
prudential reason that the Executive's agreement with Windsor on Section 3's
unconstitutionality precluded appellate review, the federal district courts in the
nation's ninety-four districts would have no precedential guidance in not only tax
refund cases, but also in litigation involving DOMA's application with respect to
more than one thousand federal statutes and regulations. 216 Because of the
important role of a Supreme Court decision resolving the constitutionality of
DOMA Section 3, and BLAG's vigorous presentation in defense of the statute, the

211Id.
212 Id.

213 Id. (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940).

214See id
15

id. at 2688.

216Id.
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majority concluded that there were strong prudential reasons for the Court to hear
2 17

Windsor.

While his justifications for appellate standing in Windsor are plausible,
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, like several past Court decisions, drew
arbitrary lines between prudential and Article III standing to reach his preferred
conclusion, which, in this case was that the Court had jurisdiction to address the
merits of the case.2 8 Even if one otherwise disagrees with the dissent in Windsor,
Justice Scalia correctly observed that "[t]he Court is eager-hungry-to tell
'
everyone its view of the legal question at the heart of this case."219
The danger of
"flexible" prudential standing rules is that a majority can pick and choose whether
220
to enforce them depending upon their views of the merits.
The majority did not decide whether Congress or either house would have had
standing to sue in its own right because of its conclusion that the Executive Branch
had both prudential and Article III standing for appellate review in light of its
adverse position of refusing to pay a refund to Windsor. 221 Justice Kennedy
explained, "[f]or these reasons, the prudential and Article III requirements are met
here; and, as a consequence, the Court need not decide whether BLAG would have
standing to challenge the District Court's ruling and its affirmance in the Court of
Appeals on BLAG's own authority. 2 22 The majority acknowledged that the
Executive's refusal to defend a statute raises serious prudential questions about
whether there will be an adverse defense of a statute essential for proper appellate
review and that such refusals would cause significant problems if they became
routine. 223 Part II of the majority opinion, which addressed jurisdiction and
standing, concluded:

217

Id.

218 See

Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 692 (arguing that the Court's distinction between prudential and

constitutional standing is often arbitrary); Stem, supra note 43, at 1173 (same); see Part I.B below
(same).
219 Windsor,
220

133 S. Ct. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Newdow, 542 U.S. at 18-25 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

221Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
222 Id.
223

Id. at 2688-89.
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But this case is not routine. And the capable defense of the law by BLAG
ensures that these prudential issues do not cloud the merits question, which is

one of immediate importance to the Federal Government and to hundreds of
thousands of persons. These circumstances support the Court's decision to

proceed to the merits.224
V.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENTING OPINION: ONLY THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH MAY REPRESENT THE UNITED
STATES AND No ARTICLE III STANDING WHEN THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION REALLY SIDES WITH WINDSOR

While recognizing that Windsor had standing to sue in the district court for a
tax refund, Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, maintained that neither party
had standing to appeal the district court's decision because both Windsor and the
United States agreed with that court's holding that DOMA Section 3 is
unconstitutional.22 5 Because Article III standing requires an injured party who
seeks genuine redress of actual harm, Justice Scalia argued that friendly, nonadversarial parties may not sue in federal court to obtain an advisory opinion.226 He
contended that the Court had never allowed a suit where a petitioner sought an
affirmance of the judgment against it.227 Justice Scalia acknowledged that "[t]he
closest we have ever come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS
v. Chadha," but he stated that the two cases were distinguishable22 because "two
parties to the [Chadha] litigation disagreed with the position of the United States
and with the court below: the House and Senate, which had intervened in the
229
case."
Justice Scalia generally took the position that the Executive has exclusive
authority under Article II's Take Care Clause to defend, or not to defend, federal

224Id.at 2689.
225Id.at 2699-2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 2699; accord Hall, supra note 144, at 1550-51 ("[A]s a textual matter, the Cases or

Controversies Clause seems plainly to require interested parties on both sides of the case. A one-sided
'case' or 'controversy' is an oxymoron.").
227Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699-2700, 700 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22

Id.at 2700-01 (discussing Chadha).

229

Id.at 2700.
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statutes. 230 Nevertheless, he acknowledged an exception, as in Chadha, when

Congress defends its institutional authority. 2 1 Unlike Windsor, Justice Scalia
explained that the Chadha litigation involved the institutional authority of
232
Congress and, therefore, Congress had standing to sue in that case:

Because Chadha concerned the validity of a mode of Congressional action-the
one-house legislative veto-the House and Senate were threatened with
destruction of what they claimed to be one of their institutional powers. The
Executive choosing not to defend that power, we permitted the House and
233
Senate to intervene. Nothing like that is present here.

As Justice Alito's dissenting opinion argued, however, Justice Scalia's and
the United States' argument that congressional standing in Chadha should be
limited to rare cases when Congress is defending its institutional or procedural
authority raises difficult line-drawing problems, as Congress also has a strong
interest in defending federal statutes-lawmaking is its central function. 234 Since
interpreting Chadha to allow congressional standing to defend federal statutes at
least in cases involving congressional institutional authority potentially opens the
door to expansion of that standing to other situations, some academics argue that
Executive authority under Article II's Take Care Clause is absolutely exclusive and
235

that Chadha is wrong to the extent it suggests otherwise.

As a member of the

230Id. at 2700-05 (arguing that the Executive has exclusive authority to defend federal statutes under

Article II, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when President refuses to enforce a
law).
231Id. at 2700 & n.2 ("[In Chadha] the Justice Department's refusal to defend the legislation was in
accord with its longstanding (and entirely reasonable) practice of declining to defend legislation that in
its view infringes upon [p]residential powers."); accord Hall, supra note 144, at 1548-49 ("Chadha, in
short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional stake to support a case or controversy where
it seeks to defend a power granted to it by a statute. Chadha does not hold that Congress may intervene
to defend any challenged federal statute .....
232 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 & n.2.
233Id. at 2700 (footnote omitted).
234Id. at 2713-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
235 Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 573-75, 623-30 (arguing that the Take Care Clause gives the

Executive exclusive authority to defend federal laws, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene
even when the President refuses to enforce a law, and that Chadha is wrong if it recognized
congressional standing to defend federal statutes even in narrow circumstances); but see Gorod, supra
note 2, at 1219-20 ("Defending [a] law.., does not focus on the operation of the law and generally will
not affect its operation at all.... [T]he Executive simply provides the court with its understanding of
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Court required to adhere to precedent, however, Justice Scalia preferred to
distinguish the situation in Chadha from that in Windsor rather than adopt an
absolutist interpretation of Article II that gives the President exclusive authority to
defend laws.236
Justice Scalia contended fu-ther that the Executive had standing in Chadha
when the litigation was in the Court of Appeals, but that the Executive never had
Article III standing to appeal in Windsor.237 Disagreeing with the majority, Justice
Scalia argued that the United States in Chadha did not have standing to appeal to
the Supreme Court from the Ninth Circuit's decision agreeing with the Executive
Branch that the challenged statute was unconstitutional, and, similarly, the
government did not have standing in Windsor to appeal from the district court's
decision agreeing with the Executive Branch that the challenged statute was
unconstitutional.238 Justice Scalia attempted to explain away the language in
Chadha that suggested that the INS had standing before the Supreme Court as
either only applying to the agency's standing before the Court of Appeals or dictum
because congressional intervention satisfied standing before the Supreme Court,
and the INS could not have standing to appeal a favorable decision by the Court of
Appeals.2 39 Finally, Justice Scalia argued that neither party had standing to appeal
from the district court's decision in Windsor because both Windsor and the
Executive Branch agreed with its decision:240
To be sure, the Court in Chadha said that statutory aggrieved-party status was
"not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the
statute in question is unconstitutional." . . . But in a footnote to that statement,
the Court acknowledged Article III's separate requirement of a "justiciable case
or controversy," and stated that this requirement was satisfied "because of the
presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties." . . . Later in its

what the Constitution requires...."); see also Greene, supra note 8, at 592 (contending that, if Congress
sues for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a law, Congress is not "controlling the
execution of law").
236 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2700 & n.2; Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 623 ("[N]o Justice in Windsor

challenged the power of the House or the Senate to sometimes stand in for the [E]xecutive and defend
federal statutes.").
237Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

23s
Id.
239Id,

240
Id.at 2701.
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opinion, the ChadhaCourt remarked that the United States' announced intention

to enforce the statute also sufficed to permit judicial review, even absent
Congressional participation.... That remark is true, as a description of the
judicial review conducted in the Court of Appeals, where the Houses of
Congress had not intervened. (The case originated in the Court of Appeals, since
it sought review of agency action under [8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)]. There, absent a
judgment setting aside the INS order, Chadha faced deportation. This passage of
our opinion seems to be addressing that initial standing in the Court of Appeals,
as indicated by its quotation from the lower court's opinion, ... But if it was
addressing standing to pursue the appeal, the remark was both the purest dictum
(as Congressional intervention at that point made the required adverseness
"beyond doubt," ... ) and quite incorrect. When a private party has a judicial
decree safely in hand to prevent his injury, additional judicial action requires that
a party injured by the decree seek to undo it. In Chadha, the intervening House
241
and Senate fulfilled that requirement. Here no one does.
By contrast, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion concluded that the Supreme
Court in Chadha had appropriately stated that the INS had standing before both the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court since the government would have followed
either court's decision to deport Chadha, even though the Executive disagreed with
the constitutionality of a deportation order, and, therefore the Executive Branch
was sufficiently adverse to Chadha to possess Article III standing in the Supreme
Court. 242 Similarly, the majority reasoned that the Executive Branch was
sufficiently adverse to Windsor to have standing to appeal to both the Second
Circuit and Supreme Court since it continually declined to pay her the estate tax
refund judgment issued by the district court. 243 Justice Kennedy's interpretation
that Chadha appears to treat the INS as having standing in both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court more accurately represents the probable intent of
the Chadha majority opinion because Justice Scalia himself acknowledged that the
language could be interpreted to mean that the INS had standing before both
courts. 21 Justice Scalia's stronger argument is that the language should be treated
as dictum because the INS was not really an adverse party in the Supreme Court on

241Id. at 2700-OI.
242Id. at 2686 (majority opinion).
243Id.

244Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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grounds that it agreed with the Court of Appeals' opinion.2 45 But Justice Scalia
failed to address Justice Kennedy's argument that the INS's position was adverse to
Chadha in both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, as the Executive
would have obeyed the order of either court to deport, despite the Government's
246
position that the statute was unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion strongly disagreed with the majority
opinion's view that "the requirement of adverseness" between the parties in a case
is merely a "prudential" principle of standing that can be waived by the federal
courts in appropriate cases. 247 He contended that the Court had always treated
adverseness between the parties as a fimdamental Article III standing
requirement.248 In the two Supreme Court cases cited by the majority where the
Court had allowed a prevailing party below to appeal, 249 "[t]here was a continuing
dispute between the parties concerning the issue raised on appeal," and the
prevailing party below asked the Court to address issues ignored by the lower court
that would significantly benefit the prevailing party if it convinced the Court to
address those issues in its favor. 25 0 Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Scalia
argued that the Court had never before allowed an appeal when "both parties
urge[d] us to affirm the judgment below."' 251 He contended that the mere presence
of amicus curiae willing to vigorously argue the other side of the issue did not
solve the requirement that there must be adverse parties to create a justiciable
"case" or "controversy" as required by Article 111.252
Justice Scalia candidly acknowledged that his approach, requiring truly
adverse parties to establish Article III standing, would prevent Supreme Court

245Id.
246 Compare id.at 2686 (majority opinion), with id.at 2700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

247Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248Id. at 2701-02.

249Id.(discussing Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011), and Roper, 445 U.S. 326).
250Id.(explaining that the prevailing party in Roper "sought to appeal the [D]istrict [Clourt's denial of

class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23" and that the prevailing police officers in
Camreta "sought to appeal the holding of Fourth Amendment violation, which would circumscribe their
future conduct; the plaintiff continued to insist that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred").
251Id.at 2702.
252 id.
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25 3
review of some statutes if the President declines to defend their constitutionality.
He explained:

That is as it should be, when both the President and the plaintiff agree that the
statute is unconstitutional. Where the Executive is enforcing an unconstitutional
law, suit will of course lie; but if, in that suit, the Executive admits the
unconstitutionality of the law, the litigation should end in an order or a consent
25 4
decree enjoining enforcement.

Justice Scalia implicitly criticized the Executive's "contrivance" in enforcing
DOMA Section 3 even though it viewed it as unconstitutional. 255 Instead, Justice
Scalia suggested:
[President Obama] could have equally chosen (more appropriately, some would
say) neither to enforce nor to defend the statute he believed to be
unconstitutional-in which event Windsor would not have been injured, the
District Court could not have refereed this friendly scrimmage, and the
Executive's determination of unconstitutionality would have escaped this
Court's desire to blurt out its view of the law. The matter would have been left,
as so many matters ought to be left, to a tug of war between the President and
the Congress, which has innumerable means (up to and including impeachment)
256
of compelling the President to enforce the laws it has written.

From an Article II perspective, rather than Justice Scalia's Article III
approach, Professor Grove even more unequivocally rejected President Obama's
goal of having the Supreme Court resolve the constitutionality of DOMA while the
Executive refused to defend it, arguing that the Executive "lacks the Article II
power-and thus lacks Article III standing-to invoke federal jurisdiction simply
257
to request 'a definitive verdict' on the validity of a federal law."

253Id.
254Id.

255Id.
256
Id.
217
Grove, supra note 9, at 30-3 1.
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Additionally, in addressing Justice Alito's legislative theory of standing
(discussed in Part VI), Justice Scalia argued that our constitutional "system"
instead requires Congress to directly confront undesirable Executive action, such as
refusing to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional statute through legislative
2 58
weapons like the denial of funding or refusal to confirm presidential appointees.
Justice Scalia does have a point that the judiciary should not be in the role of
deciding every possible dispute between the Executive and Legislative Branches
both because it would give judges too much power and because judges are illequipped to resolve every type of political dispute. Politicians are better equipped
to handle political disputes than judges through the constitutional process of
"confrontation" between the Executive and Congress.259 But first, Justice Scalia's
argument that Congress should use its legislative weapons to try to pressure a
President to enforce a statute the President believes is unconstitutional, ignores the
benefits of having courts resolve the constitutionality of the very small number of
cases in which the Executive Branch refuses to enforce or defend a statute the
President believes is unconstitutional.2 60 Second, Justice Scalia ignores the
difficulties Congress or one House faces in combating Executive refusal to enforce
a law, especially if the two Houses cannot agree on concerted action. 261 For
example, the Constitution's Article II impeachment process in theory could be used
to punish Executive officers who refuse to defend a federal statute.2 62 But the

258

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704-05.

259Id. at 2702-5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260Greene,
261

supranote 8, at 590-91.

See Greene, supra note 8, at 591 ("[A]s Carlin Meyer argues, forcing Congress to combat

presidential constitutional nonenforcement outside the courts is costly, and arguably shifts the burden of
action in a constitutionally inappropriate direction. After all, in the kind of case with which we're
concerned, Congress has already surmounted the difficult bicameralism and presentment process, only
to find a President asserting an ex-post [E]xecutive check on properly enacted legislation. Congress
could begin impeachment proceedings, or try to tie the President's hands in other ways, but these are
costly and complex and, more to the point, not directly responsive to the matter at hand. Why not get all
three branches into the mix?"); see also Frost, supra note 2, at 960-62 (observing that congressional
litigation may be necessary to address Executive nonenforcement or misinterpretation of a law because
legislative amendments forcing Executive compliance may be impractical in light of the two-thirds
majority needed in each House of Congress to override a presidential veto); see also Carlin Meyer,
Imbalance of Powers: Can CongressionalLawsuits Serve As Counterweight?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 63,
67-68, 96-98 (1992) (arguing that courts should adopt the "middle ground" approach allowing some
congressional suits against the Executive Branch for alleged nonenforcement of a law because political
remedies such as cutting off appropriations or impeachment may be impractical).
262

"The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from

Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High crimes and
Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. lI, § 4.
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impeachment process is an impractical means of forcing the Executive to defend
laws because impeachment is time-consuming: it requires a two-thirds super
majority in the Senate and a finding that presidential nonenforcement of a statute
2' 63
constitutes an "other High crime[] and Misdemeanor[].

VI. JUSTICE ALITO'S DISSENTING OPINION: ONLY THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES HAD STANDING IN WINDSOR
A.

Justice Alito's Argument for CongressionalStanding by One
House When the PresidentRefuses to Defend a Statute

Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the United States was not a proper
petitioner before the Supreme Court in Windsor on grounds that the government
agreed with Windsor that the district court's decision was correct. 64 Next, Justice
Alito considered the "much more difficult question" of whether BLAG had
standing to petition.265 Unlike the majority and Justice Scalia, Justice Alito
concluded that BLAG had "Article III standing in its own right, quite apart from its
status as an [intervener] ."266
Justice Alito contended that the House of Representatives suffered an injury
in fact sufficient for Article III standing when the Executive refused to enforce
DOMA Section 3, and that its authorized representative, BLAG, could sue in
Windsor to redress that injury. 267 Relying upon Chadha's holding that the two
Houses of Congress were .'proper parties'' to defend the constitutionality of the
one-house veto statute, Justice Alito argued that Chadha implied that Congress
suffers an injury whenever it passes federal legislation that is struck down as
unconstitutional, and the Executive refuses to defend the statute. 268 The United
States sought to limit the scope of Chadha by arguing that it "'involved an unusual
statute that vested the House and the Senate themselves each with special

263
See Greene, supra note 8, at 591 (arguing that the impeachment process is impractical in addressing a
President's refusal to enforce a statute); Meyer, supra note 256, at 96 (same). But see Grove & Devins,
supra note 9, at 624 ("In separating legislation from implementation, moreover, the Constitution makes
clear that Congress may not control those implementing federal law--outside the appointment,
statutory, and removal mechanisms specified in the Constitution.").
264Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711-12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
26

1Id. at 2712.

266

1d. at 2712 n.l.

267

Id. at 2712-14 & n.2.

261Id. at 2712-13 (quoting and discussing Chadha).
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269
procedural rights-namely, the right effectively to veto Executive action.'
Although Justice Alito, perhaps out of courtesy to his senior colleague, did not
directly mention any of Justice Scalia's counterarguments to legislative standing,
Justice Scalia made a similar argument to the Executive Branch in arguing that
legislative standing in Chadha was limited to rare cases where the Executive does
not defend the constitutionality of an institutional legislative power. 270 Justice
Alito, however, made the controversial argument that Congress has standing in any
case where the Executive refuses to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute,
because passing statutes is Congress' "central function. '27 1 Rejecting the
government's attempt to limit Chadha to cases involving special procedural
legislative rights, Justice Alito reasoned:

[T]hat is a distinction without a difference: just as the Court of Appeals decision
that the Chadha Court affirmed impaired Congress' power by striking down the
one-house veto, so the Second Circuit's decision here impairs Congress'
legislative power by striking down an Act of Congress. The United States has
not explained why the fact that the impairment at issue in Chadha was "special"
or "procedural" has any relevance to whether Congress suffered an injury.
Indeed, because legislating is Congress' central function, any impairment of that
272
function is a more grievous injury than the impairment of a procedural add-on.
Justice Alito interpreted Coleman-which authorized twenty state senators
who arguably cast the crucial votes to defeat a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution-to support his general theory of congressional standing to defend any
statute that the Executive refuses to defend and, in particular, to justify the House
of Representatives as a "necessary party" having standing in Windsor.273 He
explained:

269Id.at 2713 (quoting Brief for United States (jurisdiction) at 36).
270Id.at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) ("Because Chadhaconcerned the validity of a

mode of congressional action-the one-house legislative veto-the House and Senate were threatened
with destruction of what they claimed to be one of their institutional powers. The Executive choosing
not to defend that power, we permitted the House and Senate to intervene. Nothing like that is present
here.").
27 Id.at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting).
272id.
273Id.
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By striking down [Section] 3 of DOMA as unconstitutional, the Second Circuit
effectively "held for naught" an Act of Congress. Just as the state-senatorpetitioners in Coleman were necessary parties to the amendment's ratification,
the House of Representatives was a necessary party to DOMA's passage;
indeed, the House's vote would have been sufficient to prevent DOMA's repeal
274
if the Court had not chosen to execute that repeal judicially.
Justice Alito disagreed with the United States and Professor Jackson that
Raines rejected congressional standing. 275 First, Justice Alito argued that "Raines
dealt with individual Members of Congress and specifically pointed to the
individual Members' lack of institutional endorsement as a sign of their standing
BLAG represented the entire House of
problem. 276 By contrast,
Representatives.2 77 Second, Justice Alito contended that BLAG and the House in
the Windsor litigation played a legislative role similar to that in Coleman, which
recognized legislative standing and, unlike that in Raines, which rejected the
standing of individual Members of Congress who had not played a decisive role in
passing or defeating the challenged legislation.2 78 Justice Alito reasoned:

[T]he Members in Raines-unlike the state senators in Coleman-were not the
pivotal figures whose votes would have caused the Act to fail absent some
challenged action. Indeed, it is telling that Raines characterized Coleman as
standing "for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if
that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground
that their votes have been completely nullified." Here, by contrast, passage by
279
the House was needed for DOMA to become law.
Some academics, however, argue that the bicameral structure of Congress
requires that both Houses agree to take action and does not allow one House to take

274Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.at 2712 n.2.

278

Id.
at 2714.

279 Id.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) a DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.318
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

WINDSOR

&

CONGRESSIONAL

STANDING

PAGE

1 55

independent judicial action. 28 0 But the Constitution's requirements for bicameral
legislative action in Article I, § 1-requiring all legislative powers to be vested in a
Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives-and § 7requiring every bill to be passed by both the House and Senate before being
presented to the President-do not directly or clearly prohibit congressional
standing by one House of Congress. 28' Furthermore, as is implied by Justice Alito's
discussion of Coleman and Raines, neither case claimed or explicitly required that
282
all congressional litigation must be undertaken by bicameral action.
Indirectly responding to Justice Scalia's view that the Executive has the sole
authority under the Constitution to defend all federal statutes and the unbridled
discretion not to defend a statute,28 3 Justice Alito argued that Congress had the
authority to defend federal statutes in those rare cases in which the Executive did
not:
I appreciate the argument that the Constitution confers on the President alone the
authority to defend federal law in litigation, but in my view, as I have explained,
that argument is contrary to the Court's holding in Chadha, and it is certainly
contrary to the Chadha Court's endorsement of the principle that 'Congress is
the proper party to defend the validity of a statute' when the Executive refuses to
do so on constitutional grounds. Accordingly, in the narrow category of cases in
which a court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to
defend the Act, Congress both has standing to defend the undefended statute and
is a proper party to do so.284

280 Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 572-75, 603-22 (arguing that bicameral principles in the

constitution bar one House of Congress from defending a challenged federal statute).
281U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (prescribing bicameralism and presentment requirements for legislation);
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46 (discussing bicameral provisions in Article I of the Constitution).
212 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713-14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing Coleman and Raines); see also
Part 1I.B above.
213See id. at 2703-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Executive has broad discretion whether to
enforce federal laws pursuant to the Take Care Clause and that Congress does not have standing without
an injury to challenge Executive nonenforcement); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-78 (concluding
Article III and Article II of the Constitution limit Congress' authority to authorize citizen suits by any
person lacking a concrete injury); Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 573-74, 625-32 (arguing that the
Take Care Clause gives the Executive exclusive authority to defend federal laws, thus excluding
congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce a law).
284Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, Professor Grove argued that Article I does not confer any
authority on Congress to defend or enforce federal statutes and, accordingly, that
285
Congress lacks Article III standing to defend federal statutes in federal courts.
However, Professor Grove's interesting argument is inconsistent with Chadha,
which she necessarily argues was wrongly decided to the extent it allowed House
and Senate counsel to intervene in the case to defend the constitutionality of the
286
statute.
B.

Justice Scalia's Criticism ofJustice Alito's Argument

Justice Scalia tried to rebut Justice Alito's argument for congressional
standing and instead contended that the Executive has the sole authority under the
Constitution to defend all federal statutes, except in cases like Chadha where
Congress is defending its institutional authority. 287 While acknowledging that
Justice Alito's theory of jurisdiction was more limited than the "majority's
conversion of constitutionally required adverseness into a discretionary element of
standing," Justice Scalia complained that Justice Alito's approach "similarly
elevates the Court to the 'primary' determiner of constitutional questions involving
the separation of powers, and, to boot, increases the power of the most dangerous
branch" by establishing a new system "in which Congress can hale the Executive
before the courts not only to vindicate its own institutional powers to act, but to
correct a perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws. '288 While federal courts
traditionally could not decide whether a disputed statute was constitutional until an
injured private party filed suit, Justice Scalia contended that Justice Alito's

285Grove, supra note 9, at 3-4, 39-48.
286 Id. at 46-47 ("The Supreme Court overlooked these structural concerns [arguing against

congressional enforcement or defense of federal laws] entirely in Chadha,when it permitted the House
and Senate counsel to intervene in defense of the statute authorizing the legislative veto.... But the
Court did not authorize intervention by any component of Congress until Chadha. Given the lack of
historical support for the Court's assertion, and the fact that the Court did not even hold that the House
or the Senate had standing to appeal, this one-sentence declaration in Chadha provides scant support for
congressional standing to represent the federal government in court.").
287See id.
at 2702-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the President has broad discretion whether to

enforce federal laws pursuant to the Take Care Clause and that Congress does not have standing without
an injury to challenge executive nonenforcement); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-78 (concluding that
Article III
and Article II limit Congress' authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a
concrete injury); Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 572-73, 625-35 (arguing that the Take Care Clause
gives the Executive exclusive authority to defend federal laws, thus excluding congressional standing to
intervene even when the President refuses to enforce a law).
288 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704.
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approach would create a new framework "in which Congress and the Executive can
pop immediately into court, in their institutional capacity, whenever the President
refuses to implement a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, and whenever he
2 89
implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress's liking."
It is unclear whether Justice Scalia's point is a fair interpretation of Justice
Alito's position because the facts of Windsor did not involve that situation and
Justice Alito did not directly address any scenario in which Congress could
challenge the Executive's implementation of a statute, unless the President simply
refused to enforce the statute on grounds that it is unconstitutional.2

90

Justice Scalia

was arguably on firmer ground when he speculated that Justice Alito's approach to
congressional standing would at least open the door for litigants to make plausible
arguments in an attempt to expand legislative standing to political disputes
traditionally avoided by the federal courts.291 Justice Scalia argued that the
reasoning of Raines foreclosed suits by Congress about how the Executive
administers the laws of the United States, even if Justice Alito was technically
correct that the decision "did not formally decide this issue" because the opinion
discussed several disputes between the President and Congress about the
appointment power, removal power, legislative veto, and pocket veto that
traditionally were not litigated in court, but would have been settled by the federal
courts under Alito's approach to legislative standing. 292 Instead of Alito's broad
approach to legislative standing and judicial resolution of disputes between the two
political branches, Justice Scalia argued that the Executive and Congress should
use traditional political tools such as the appropriations or appointment processes if
Congress is dissatisfied by a President's nonenforcement of a statute the President
293
believes is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration's "middle" position of continuing to enforce
DOMA Section 3 while arguing that the provision was unconstitutional was crucial
in allowing the United States Supreme Court to review the Windsor case.2 94 The

289

Id,

29oCompare id.at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with id.at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).

291Id.at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292 Id.

293 Id. at

2704-05.

294
See Parts 11.B, II.C above.
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majority opinion conceded that standing before the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court would have been questionable if the Executive had simply paid Windsor her
refund as ordered by the district court.295 A good justification for Attorney General
Holder's middle approach is that a President's nominal enforcement of a
controversial statute is sometimes essential to create sufficient adverseness for
appellate review because the standing of Congress in such situations is not clear
even after Windsor, and the Obama Administration's approach enabled the
Supreme Court to finally resolve the constitutionality of DOMA Section 3.296
As discussed in Parts IV and V, in Windsor, the majority and Justice Scalia
disagreed with respect to the circumstances in which a president should decline to
enforce a federal statute in.general and the DOMA statute in particular.2 97 Justice
Scalia's dissent argued that a President should only refuse to enforce a statute that
undermines the institutional authority of the Executive Branch, such as the
legislative veto statute in Chadha, but that a President should not refuse to enforce
a statute like DOMA for mere policy reasons. 298 While generally supporting the
Obama Administration's middle position of enforcing but not defending DOMA
Section 3, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion acknowledged that presidential
nonenforcement of a statute in some circumstances can prevent judicial review to
determine its constitutionality, which raises serious separation of powers concerns
by nullifying Legislative power, and, therefore, a President should not routinely
refuse to enforce any statute whose policies are personally disagreeable. 299 Whether

295 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
296 See Parts II,
IV above.

297See Parts IV, V above.

298Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[In Chadha] the Justice Department's refusal
to defend the legislation was in accord with its longstanding (and entirely reasonable) practice of
declining to defend legislation that in its view infringes upon Presidential powers. There is no
justification for the Justice Department's abandoning the law in the [Windsor] case."); see also Meltzer,
supra note 2, at 1199-1201 ("The strong tradition of defending acts of Congress also does not extend to
separation-of-powers cases-at least not to those that involve a conflict between [L]egislative and
[E]xecutive powers."); id.at 1202-05 (observing there are only a handful of cases "in which the
[E]xecutive refuses to defend a statute that involves no incursion upon [E]xecutive authority, even
though colorable arguments for the statute's constitutionality could be advanced.").
299 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688. ("The Court's conclusion that this petition may be heard on the merits

does not imply that no difficulties would ensue if this were a common practice in ordinary cases. The
Executive's failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory
not yet established in judicial decisions has created a procedural dilemma.... Similarly, with respect to
the legislative power, when Congress has passed a statute and a President has signed it, it poses grave
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President Obama should have refused to defend DOMA raises complex questions
because, on the one hand, DOMA was passed only seventeen years earlier by large
congressional majorities and signed into law by President Clinton; but, on the other
hand, evolving public views on same-sex marriage have lead many people in recent
years to think that DOMA's denial of federal benefits to same-sex married couples
30 0
is fundamentally discriminatory.
The Chadha decision provides the strongest support for the reasoning in the
Windsor majority opinion, as even Justice Scalia acknowledged. 301 The Chadha
decision appeared to state that the Executive has appellate standing in federal
courts as long as it would actually enforce a law that the President asserts is
unconstitutional. 30 2 Attorney General Holder's middle strategy of enforcing
DOMA Section 3, even as the DOJ argued that the provision was unconstitutional,
is enough for standing if the INS had standing before the Supreme Court in a
similar situation in Chadha. However, Justice Scalia argued that the Chadha
decision was wrong to the extent that it allowed the INS standing to appeal a
30 3
favorable Ninth Circuit decision to the Supreme Court.
The Court in Windsor held plausibly based on precedent that party
adverseness is a flexible prudential principle and not a mandatory Article III rule. 31'
Nevertheless, the Court in Windsor, like in other Court opinions, conveniently
manipulated hazy distinctions between prudential and Article III standing to

challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to be able to nullify
Congress' enactment solely on its own initiative and without any determination from the Court.").
" Compare Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1208-35 (discussing conflicting arguments about whether the
Obama Administration should have defended DOMA, noting "I have tried to set forth a range of reasons
why the [E]xecutive [B]ranch should enforce and defend statutes such as Don't Ask, Don't Tell and
DOMA-even when it views them as wrongheaded, discriminatory, and indeed as shameful denials of
equal protection"), with Rider-Longmaid, supra note 8, at 361-62 (concluding that "by continuing to
enforce DOMA while advancing exhaustive reasoning in litigation for its unconstitutionality, Obama
has facilitated judicial resolution of the issue and respected the separation of powers" and also arguing
that Executive non-defense of a statute is especially appropriate if the President believes statute violates
fundamental equal protection rights, as in the DOMA litigation in Windsor).
...Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The closest we have ever come to what the
Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v. Chadha.").
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2686-87 (discussing Chadha,462 U.S. 939-40 & n.12).

302

303Compare id.at 2686 (arguing that the INS had standing before the Supreme Court in Chadha), with

id. at 2700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing).
3

Id.at 2685-86 (majority opinion).
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determine that it had jurisdiction to address the merits of the case. 305 The vagueness
of the line between prudential and Article III standing allows federal courts and,
most notably, the Supreme Court in some cases, to find or deny jurisdiction based
30 6
on whether a majority wants to decide or avoid the merits.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Windsor, argued that neither party had an
injury justifying standing and judicial review once the Executive agreed with the
judgment of the district court in favor of Windsor.3" 7 He contended that the Court
had never before allowed an appeal when "both parties urge[d] [the Court] to
affirm the judgment below."30 8 For Justice Scalia, party adverseness was an
essential requirement of Article III standing and not simply a waivable prudential
principle as claimed by the majority. 309 Additionally, Justice Scalia made a strong
argument that Article II's Take Care Clause normally gives the Executive the
exclusive authority to defend federal statutes and to refuse to defend a federal
law. 310 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion conceded an exception to
that rule by recognizing the authority of Congress to represent itself in separation
311
of powers cases involving its institutional authority.
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion appropriately raised the question of whether
there ought to be another exception to the Take Care Clause that grants Executive
authority over federal statutes when the President refuses to defend a statute, on

305See id.at 2698-702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for manipulating adverseness
doctrine to find standing so it could decide the merits of the case); Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 692
(arguing that the Court's distinction between prudential and constitutional standing is often arbitrary);
Stem, supra note 43, at 1173 (same); see Part I.B above (same).
6 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2698-702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for manipulating the
adverseness doctrine to find standing so it could decide the merits of the case); Chemerinsky, supranote
43, at 692; Stem, supranote 43, at 1173.
307Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699-2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'0'
Id.at 2702.
309
Id.
at 2699-2702.
310
Id. at 2700-05 (arguing that the Executive has exclusive authority to defend federal statutes under
Article 1,thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce
a law).
31Id. at 2700 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[In Chadha] the Justice Department's refusal to defend the
legislation was in accord with its longstanding (and entirely reasonable) practice of declining to defend
legislation that in its view infringes upon Presidential powers."); Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at 623
("[N]o Justice in Windsor challenged the power of the House or the Senate to sometimes stand in for the
[E]xecutive and defend federal statutes.").
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grounds that lawmaking is the central function of the Legislative Branch and such
Executive action, therefore, causes injury to Congress similar to the injury in
Chadha.31 2 Justice Alito boldly proclaimed a new approach to congressional
standing that would allow Congress or either House to defend a federal statute that
the Executive refuses to defend.3" 3 Even if Justice Scalia is correct that courts have
recognized that no one may have standing to defend the constitutionality of a
statute,314 Justice Alito correctly suggested that Coleman raises the possibility that
those legislators crucial to a statute's passage or defeat-which arguably includes
each House of Congress-should be able to challenge the Executive's
nonenforcement of a federal law.3 15 The legislative standing of legislative leaders
representing a legislative house is arguably different than the Court's refusal in
316
Raines to recognize standing by individual legislators.
The majority in Windsor did not go as far as Justice Alito in recognizing
congressional standing, but the Court's determination that "BLAG's sharp
adversarial presentation of the issues satisfi[ed] the prudential concerns that
otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the
principal parties agree" 317 opens the door for more congressional intervention in
cases where a President enforces a law that the President believes is
unconstitutional. Perhaps the majority was unwilling to go as far as Justice Alito
because the line between legislative standing in Coleman and the rejection of
standing for individual legislators in Raines is not clear.318 Yet the Court's
conclusion in Windsor, that one House of Congress may supply the necessary
adverseness in litigation where the Executive refuses to defend but continues to
enforce a statute is a step toward adopting Justice Alito's view of congressional
standing by either House of Congress in those rare cases in which the President
refuses to defend a federal statute. Because Justice Scalia made a strong argument
in his dissent that Article II's Take Care Clause gives the President almost

312Id. at

2713-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).

3"3
Id.at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
314Id. at

2699-2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

311
Id.at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
316 See

id.2713 (discussing the legislative standing distinction between Coleman and Raines); Part 11.B

above (same).
317 Windsor,

133 S. Ct. at 2687-88 (majority opinion).

311See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the legislative standing distinction

between Coleman and Raines); supraPart 11.B (same).
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exclusive authority to defend federal statutes, except when Congress defends its
own institutional authority as in Chadha, the Court arguably will not endorse
Justice Alito's congressional standing theory when it is less controversial to allow
limited congressional participation in a "middle" situation where the Executive
nominally enforces a statute it does not defend.319 By relying on BLAG's brief to
satisfy concerns about adversarial presentation of opposing arguments and
concluding that congressional briefs played a similar role in Chadha, the Court in
Windsor implied that in future cases federal courts should give significant weight to
Congress, at least in cases where the
amicus briefs filed by Congress or a House of
32 0
Executive does not defend a federal statute.
Whether the Court would have recognized appellate standing for either the
Executive or Congress in Windsor if the Obama Administration had refused to
enforce DOMA Section 3 and paid a tax refund to Windsor as soon as she won in
district court remains an open question that federal courts may have to confront
someday.

319 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2698-705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Grove & Devins, supra note 9, at

573-74, 625-32 (arguing that the Take Care Clause gives the Executive exclusive authority to defend
federal laws, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to
enforce a law).
320 See Part

IV above.
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